The Reception of David Hume in Czech Thought

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The following crude bits of historical context are relevant for the scope of my paper: between the 1760s and 1780s, Latin was being replaced by German at the universities on Bohemian territory. Between the 1810s and 1840s, Czech language was intensively cultivated, in order to make it suitable again for literary and scholarly use, and from 1861 courses in Czech were regularly taught at Charles University in Prague.¹ In 1882, Charles University was divided into two, one German and one Czech. In 1900, the first philosophical journal in Czech was founded: before that, papers on philosophical topics appeared occasionally in Czech scholarly journals of more general scope which had started in the 1820s. In 1945-46, the German-language scholarly community on Bohemian territory disappeared, following the expulsion of Germans from the renewed Czechoslovakia.

I shall consider the reception of Hume in Latin and German only where it concerns the Czech community. This covers all activities on the Bohemian territory up to 1882, regardless of language (insofar as before that date, Czechs received their education in a Latin- or German-speaking academic environment). The activities in the German-speaking community after 1882 are out of the scope of my paper.

In the first section I deal with early reception of Hume, ranging from simple mentions of his name (sometimes, apparently, based on little knowledge of his work) to more detailed and better informed depictions. In the second section, I discuss T. G. Masaryk’s identification of Hume as the key figure for understanding modernity in the 1880s, and with the following developments including the first four translations from 1899-1900. In the third section, I consider the period between the World Wars, focussing on the first two books in Czech on Hume, both of some relevance for the history of Hume scholarship. In the final section, I mention more recent developments, which include two further translations and one monograph.

¹ Charles University (then Charles-Ferdinand University) was the only remaining university in Bohemia after Olomouc University was dissolved in 1860.
1. Early Reception (up to 1882)

It has been claimed\(^2\) that David Hume was first introduced into the Bohemian intellectual milieu by Karl Heinrich Seibt (1735-1806), one of the key figures of the Bohemian Enlightenment. After a few years in Prague, Seibt studied mainly in Leipzig, the centre of German Enlightenment in those days ('little Paris', as it was often called). In 1763, Seibt became the first non-Jesuit professor at the Faculty of Philosophy of the Prague University since 1622, when it was handed to the Jesuits by the victorious Hapsburg forces (the traditional Aristotelian curriculum had been abandoned in Prague only in 1752, in favour of the philosophy of Wolff and especially the science of Newton). Seibt was among the first in Prague to teach in German, and he was a very successful and influential teacher. Subsequently he was involved in building and inspecting the network of over one thousand elementary schools in Bohemia. Besides philosophy, he lectured on German literature, rhetoric and modern history. He is said to mention Hume among other Enlightenment figures favourably in his lectures, but he had strong incentives not to write about them: in 1779, Seibt’s opponents initiated a police raid on Prague bookstores and private libraries, searching for books forbidden by the Church, and they claimed that the enormously high circulation of forbidden books in Prague resulted from Seibt’s oral recommendations. The first denunciation was rejected by the emperor’s office, but on the basis of the second Seibt was briefly suspended, although cleared following intervention by the empress.\(^3\)

An entirely different early view of Hume can be found in the work of Bohuslav Herwig (1723-1779). Herwig was the professor of philosophy at the Archbishop Seminary in Prague, and later the Abbot of the Strahov monastery there. In his *Antidotum libertinismi moderni* (Antidote against modern free-thinking, 1768), republished in 1776 in Osijek, Croatia, he reports and twice rejects Hume’s opinion that religion develops from superstition (1768, 112, 115-17, 203-4) (1776, 73,75-7, 133). He also mentions Hume in connection with the opinion that morality can be based solely on human natural inclinations and with the

\(^{2}\) Král (1937, 20) and Sousedík (1997, 275). Seibt’s lecturing about Hume and Rousseau is mentioned also in Masaryk (1994-, 6: 30).

\(^{3}\) On Seibt, see Winter (1943, 85-102).
attack on Christ’s miracles (1768, 33, 85) (1776, 23, 56). Herwig also mentions Hume’s alleged disbelief in Christ’s miracles in a third work (1770, 264, 509 and 514).4

Still on this rather superficial level are František Palacký’s remarks about Hume, possibly the first printed references to Hume in Czech. František Palacký (1798-1876) was one of the most prominent Bohemian public figures of the 19th century, an historian with great political influence. As a young man, he spent about five years focusing on philosophy, especially aesthetics, studying first in Poszony -- today Bratislava -- and then as a private tutor in the Hungarian countryside and in Vienna. In his 'Přehled dějin Krasovědy a gej literatury' (1823) (An Outline of the History of Aesthetics and Its Literature), published in the first Czech-language scholarly journal Krok, he very briefly mentioned Hume:

Among the English [sic] aestheticicians of the same epoch, D. Hume also deserves a word of praise [...], a famous historian and philosopher, who, however, together with A. Smith, considers pure decorativity to be of supreme value, [...].5

Palacký had good first-hand knowledge of Hugh Blair’s and Lord Kames’ aesthetics,6 and valued Kames’ aesthetics highly (1871, 365), but it seems that he did not have any first-hand knowledge of Hume’s aesthetic writings (certainly he included nothing by Hume in his bibliography of over a hundred works, at the end of his article). Palacký’s remark about his own early struggle with scepticism, in his manuscript autobiography written in 1823, reminds one of Hume, but there is no confirmation of a direct influence:

It is impossible to remain for long in a real and consequent sceptical attitude; the existence of our feelings affects us too forcefully and makes it impossible for us to doubt our existence, hopes and duties any more.7

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4 Sousedík’s hypothesis (1997, 285) that the main source of material for Herwig’s polemical books was Thorschmid’s Versuch einer vollständigen Freydenker-Bibliothek (An Attempt of a Complete Library of Free-Thinkers, 1765) apparently does not hold for Herwig’s remarks on Hume.

5 ‘Chwalného připomenutj mezi krasowědi anglickými téhož wěku zasluhuj také [...] D. Hume, slawný děıpisec a filosof, gemuž ale, gakož i A. Smithowi, čistá ozdobnost nadewšecko byla’ (Palacký 1823, 53).

6 Blair (1783) was among Palacký’s earliest reading in aesthetics; he borrowed it from a certain Mr. Egan, a groom of Count Gražalkovič in Poszony, and took extensive notes in 1818. Palacký reports that Mr. Egan owned ‘an excellent collection of books’ (Palacký 1941, 31).

7 ‘Není možná, aby člověk v opravdovém a důsledném skepticismu dlouho setrval; jestota citův našich příliš zřejmě na nás naléhá, než abychom déle o bytu, o nadějích a povinnostech svých pochybovatí mohli.’ (Palacký 1941, 24)
Like Palacký, Bernard Bolzano (1781-1848) did not care much for Hume’s aesthetics: in his *Abhandlungen zur Ästhetik* (Treatises on Aesthetics) (1843) he does not mention Hume at all, although he discusses in some detail Hutcheson, Locke, Home, Shaftesbury and Burke (Bolzano 1843, 48, 52, 55). However, Bolzano did refer to Hume several times in his lectures about religion, published anonymously by his students as *Lehrbuch der Religionswissenschaft* (Textbook of Religion Studies) in 1834. Bolzano had studied in Prague and taught religious studies there from 1805; his dismissal from the university in 1819 coincided with the happy acquisition of private support, and allowed him to focus on the logical work that later made him famous.

The text of the *Lehrbuch* (1834) closely matches the transcript of Bolzano’s lecture notes from 1818 (Loužil 1994, 12). Bolzano refers to Hume on three topics: the view that moral duty cannot be deduced from concepts but is based on moral feeling, objections to the reliability of miracle testimonies, and objections to miracles in other religions (Lehrbuch 1834, 1: 243; 2:37; 2: 259). It should be noted that Bolzano regularly discussed opinions without naming their source, and he may therefore sometimes be discussing Hume without mentioning him. The following passage can serve as a representative sample of Bolzano’s description of Hume in his lectures about religion:

One of the brightest <of the sceptics> was *David Hume* who strived, *in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, in his *Essay on Miracles*, and in other writings, to destroy every belief in God, immortality, and revelation.*

Bolzano is reported (Bolzano 1995, 252) as owning a copy of the German translation of Hume’s *Dialogues, Gespräche über natürliche Religion* (1781).

In his *Wissenschaftslehre* (Theory of Science) (1837), Bolzano mentioned Hume only rarely: there is a bare mention in connection with laws of association of ideas, and a polemical passage which misconstrues Hume’s views of causality (1837, 3: 81, 167). However, it may be the case again that Hume’s opinions are being discussed without naming him: thus Berg (1992, 14-15) discusses the possibility that Bolzano’s transcendental sentences are introduced as an answer Hume’s problems about the justification of induction.

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8 See e.g. *Lehrbuch* (1834, 1: 399-400) and (2: 70-1).
9 ‘Einer der scharfsinnigsten war *David Hume*, der sich in seiner Gesprächen über die natürliche Religion, in seinem Versuche über die Wunder und in andern Schriften bemühte, allen Glauben an Gott, Unsterblichkeit und Offenbarung zu vernichten.’ (Lehrbuch 1834, 1: 301)
A recurrent topos in Bohemian literature on Hume, as elsewhere, is the depiction of an arch-sceptic whose main, and only role in the history of philosophy, was to serve as a reductio ad absurdum of empiricism, and perhaps to awaken Kant from his dogmatic slumber. Such a depiction can be found in Auszug der Wissenswürdigsten aus der Geschichte der Philosophie (The Extract of What Is Most Worth Knowing in the History of Philosophy) (1836, 121-24) by Johann Ritter von Lichtenfels (1793-1866), who was a professor in Prague in the 1830s and a follower of Jacobi. According to him, Hume’s philosophy can serve as an ‘evident demonstration that empiricism leads to scepticism, and thus undermines itself’.\(^\text{10}\)

For some fifty years, philosophy in Prague University was dominated by adherence to the philosophy of Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776-1841). Herbartism was introduced by Franz Exner (1802-1853), whose professorship in Prague (1832-48) was also marked by a significant raising of academic standards; together with Hermann Bonitz he was the architect of the celebrated Austrian high-schools reform from 1849, and a respected correspondent of Bernard Bolzano. Herbartists typically viewed Hume as an arch-sceptic. Ignác Jan Hanuš (1812-1869), a student of Lichtenfels and Exner who combined Herbartism with Hegelianism, seems to have had only a vague knowledge of Hume (Hanuš 1863, 113). Josef Dastich (1835-1870), the first professor in Prague who lectured regularly in Czech, at least viewed Hume as more reasonable than the Pyrrhonists, and acknowledged his influence on ‘the great Kant’ (1867, 227). Josef Durdík (1837-1902) holds basically the same view, but in his more extensive description (1870, 163-75) he distinguishes in Hume between scepticism of darkness and scepticism of progress (i.e. criticism of tradition and superstition), and appreciates the latter.

A somewhat more thoughtful discussion can be found in the chapter on Hume in Augustin Smetana’s Die Katastrophe und der Ausgang der Geschichte der Philosophie (The Decisive Turn of the History of Philosophy and Its Result, 1850).\(^\text{11}\) Smetana (1814-1851) was the most brilliant of Czech ‘Hegelians’, i.e. those who attempted to synthesize Herbart with Hegel. His brief academic career was broken in 1849, when he was dismissed from all teaching positions in retaliation for his political activities in 1848. Smetana disagreed with

\(^\text{10}\) ‘Die hume’sche Lehre ist der augenscheinliche Beweis dafür, daß der Empirismus zum Skepticismus führt, und also sich selbst aufhebt.’ (Lichtenfels 1836, 123-24).

\(^\text{11}\) Smetana (1850, 212-228); Czech translations (1903, 287-300) and (1960, 1: 309-16).
Hegel’s low opinion of Hume: for Smetana, Hume’s philosophy marks the beginning of the philosophy of consciousness. This stage is reached by his undermining the concepts of causality and of substance, which were crucial for the metaphysics of Leibniz and his followers. Like Kant, Hume was aware of the shortcomings of both rationalism and empiricism, but unlike him, he got stuck in a position with no positive result to embrace. In ethics, Smetana approvingly interprets Hume as a predecessor of Herbart. Unlike the authors mentioned above, Smetana quotes Hume (both from the Treatise and the first Enquiry); however, Marie Bayerová has shown that most – if not all – of the quotations are compiled from secondary German sources (Smetana 1960, 390-91 and 423).

2. Masaryk and His Influence (1880s to 1910s)

A profound change was introduced into the Czech reception of Hume by Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk (1850-1937). Like Palacký, Masaryk was the most prominent Czech public figure of his generation, and from 1918-35 served as President of Czechoslovakia for four consecutive terms. He studied philosophy in Vienna, became a lecturer there in 1879, and in 1882 was made a professor of philosophy in the new Czech university in Prague. He taught there until 1914, simultaneously served for three terms as a member of parliament in Vienna, and in 1915-18 was the leader of Czech anti-Austrian resistance in exile. He was a complex figure defying a simple characterization, but one can safely say that a main part of his early program was to reorient and modernize Czech philosophy, to free it of its provincialism and one-sided orientation on the German-language context. He has been often described as a positivist, and for a few decades, positivism became the dominant school in Czech philosophy (represented by figures like Krejčí, Drtina and Král). However, Masaryk’s attitude to positivism was ambivalent: on the one hand, he wanted his early students to see Comte and Mill as the most important recent philosophers, on the other, he criticized them from his realistic and 'concretistic' standpoint. As early as 1885, Masaryk’s main interest shifted from academic philosophy to more broadly conceived public and political work.

David Hume played a central role in Masaryk’s early philosophical program. In a statement in Masaryk’s dossier submitted for his Vienna Habilitation in 1877, Hume figures on the short list of five philosophers that influenced him most (Nejedlý 1930-37, 2: 19). His 1882 inaugural lecture in Prague had Hume as the topic (Masaryk 1883a). While still in
Vienna, Masaryk translated Hume’s second *Enquiry* into German (Hume 1883). In his published lecture notes from the History of Philosophy course of 1889, Hume occupies 59 pages -- compared to Plato 23, Aristotle 33, Descartes 18 and Locke 39 pages (Masaryk 1889, 654-712); he says there that Hume ‘imprints on his own epoch, and to a large extent still on ours, its central philosophical character’. All this contrasted sharply with the neglectful and sometimes ignorant attitude to Hume, previously common in Prague.

Masaryk’s conception of Hume is not particularly original or profound, but it is based on first-hand knowledge of Hume’s mature texts (he does not care much for the *Treatise*) and contains several interesting, possibly original insights. Masaryk deals with Hume mainly in the following four contexts: (1) epistemology, (2) religion, (3) overall character of Hume and his philosophy, and (4) his position in the history of European thought. Let us have a brief look at each of them.

(1) According to Masaryk, Hume formulated with great clarity a set of basic epistemological problems that determine the agenda for subsequent philosophy: ‘To this day, Hume is the main stumbling block in philosophy’. In his Prague inaugural lecture *Počet pravděpodobnosti a Humova skepse: Historický úvod v teorii indukce* (Probability Calculus and Hume’s Scepticism: A Historical Introduction into the Theory of Induction, 1883), published also in a much shorter German version *Dav. Humes Skepsis und die Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Logik und Philosophie* (Dav. Hume’s Scepticism and Probability Calculus: A Contribution to the History of Logic and Philosophy, 1884), Masaryk summarizes Hume’s views of causality and induction, discusses the answers of Reid, Kant and Beneke, contrasting them with another group of answers, based on probability calculus, by Sulzer, Mendelssohn, Lacroix and Poisson (Masaryk 1994-, 6: 16-33) and concludes with a sketch of the importance of probability calculus for philosophy in general. Masaryk’s complaints that the probability-based answers to Hume are entirely neglected by philosophers and logicians damaged his relationship with his Vienna teacher Franz Brentano, who apparently also discussed that topic in his classes in the 1870’s.

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12 Hume ‘době své a do značné míry ještě i naší dává hlavní ráz filosofický’ (Masaryk 1889: 654).
13 ‘Hume podnes filosofii […] je hlavním kamenem úrazu’ (Masaryk 1897: 333) (1934, 77).
In a series of popular essays 'Moderní člověk a náboženství' (Modern Man and Religion, 1897), published as a book in 1934, Masaryk discusses the sources of modern irreligiosity and, like Leslie Stephen (1962, 1), finds Hume again to be of crucial importance: 'I recognize ever more clearly that the discussion of modernity must begin with him.' Hume ostensibly opposes true religion to false: true religion is philosophical and rational, false is vulgar and superstitious. But one can question how sincere was Hume about true religion, and what it should look like given Hume’s sceptical limitation of the legitimate use of reason. His real goal is to attack established religion, to which his entire theoretical philosophy is directed (1897, 330-32).

Masaryk is not only fascinated by Hume’s powers of analysis and polemics and by his courage in drawing disturbing consequences, but he is also puzzled by Hume’s remarkable cheerfulness (remember, Masaryk’s Hume is the Hume of the Enquiries and the Dialogue). To be sure, Masaryk notices that Hume knows that consequent scepticism is impossible, and that any viable scepticism is a matter of degree or moderation (1897, 913) (1934, 235), and he notices that while Hume is a sceptic in metaphysics, he is no sceptic in ethics, where he relies on the feeling of sympathy (1897, 334 and 408) (1934, 79 and 105). He is also attracted by the paradox of Hume’s supreme and consequent rationality, which leads to the elevation of sentiment over reason: this may harmonise with Masaryk’s own tendency towards pluralism in philosophy. But I think that he came closest to expressing his tentative solution of the puzzle of Hume’s cheerfulness in the following passage (in which he ascribes to Hume a position which may be compatible with Masaryk’s own conception of civil religiosity): 'Hume is no pessimist; rather, his ultimate decision is to simply take the world as it is […] His cheerful mood justifies our conjecture that he was using scepticism only as a means to a purely positive world-view.'

In spite of all Hume’s shortcomings, subsequent philosophy has to deal with the agenda set by him, and it did not get very far with it. Neither Kant nor Comte solved Hume’s problem; both Comte and Mill stand on the ground gained by Hume, and Comte in particular

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15 'Poznávám pořád lépe, že pro moderní dobu musíme vycházet od něho.' (Masaryk 1897: 334) (1934, 78).
16 'Hume není pessimistou, nýbrž definitivním rozhodnutím jeho jest, že máme svět přijímati prostě tak, jak je […] Jeho veselá životní nálada oprávňuje k domněně, že užíval skepsie pouze jako prostředku k čistě pozitivnímu názoru světovému.' (Masaryk 1904, 298) (1994-, 1: 164).
follows Hume not only in epistemology, but also in ethics and philosophy of religion (Hume 1883, iii-iv; Masaryk 1994-, 1.164). Nietzsche derived more from Hume than many Nietzscheans know; moreover, those who are so impressed by Nietzsche nowadays should read Hume, for 'in comparison with him, Nietzsche is a child'.\textsuperscript{17} In a speech in the Vienna parliament in 1908, Masaryk declared: 'Since the time of Kant and Hume, each cultural and spiritual entity appears to us as a product of human mind.'\textsuperscript{18} To sum up: 'Scepticism or belief? – that is the question of modern philosophy.'\textsuperscript{19} And: 'In brief, the long philosophical discussion from Hume to Spencer amounts to this: we want, we even have to believe – but whom and in what?\textsuperscript{20}

Masaryk greatly influenced the following generation of Czech intellectuals. One of them, Jan Laichter (1858-1946), met Masaryk in the 1880s when he worked in the editorial team of the Otto Encyclopaedia of which Masaryk originally was the head. In 1893, Laichter founded, with Masaryk and Drtina, the review \textit{Naše doba}, and in 1896 he founded his own publishing house, soon becoming the leading Czech publisher in philosophy and social science. Among the first philosophical books published there, are two volumes of translations of Hume: in 1899 the two \textit{Enquiries} and in 1900 \textit{NHR} and \textit{DNR}. The translation by Josef Škola, a high-school professor, is rather good by the standards of the day – its language may strike today’s reader as old fashioned, and it was never elegant, but it is reasonably reliable philosophically. The \textit{Enquiries} volume contains an extensive index (1899, 345-368), which is based on that of Selby-Bigge (whose 1894 edition was used by Škola). The omission of the \textit{Treatise} from the translation project may reflect Masaryk’s clear preference for the later writings, which he may have inherited from his teacher Brentano (1987, 47).

Another of Masaryk’s followers, František Čáda (1865-1918), a lecturer at Charles University, wrote a well-informed entry on Hume (Čáda, 1897) for the Otto Encyclopaedia (which remains to this day in many ways the best encyclopaedia available in Czech language).

\textsuperscript{17} 'Nietzsche je proti němu dítě' (Masaryk 1897, 333) (1934, 76).
\textsuperscript{18} 'veškerá duchovní práce, každý duchovní produkt se nám od dob Kantových a Humových jeví jako něco, co bylo vytvořeno z lidského ducha.' – the speech of 6. 7. 1908 (Masaryk 1994-, 29: 115).
\textsuperscript{19} 'Skepsi či víru? – to je tedy otázka moderní filosofie.' (Masaryk 1897, 913) (1934, 235).
\textsuperscript{20} 'dlouhé filosofické řeči od Huma do Spencera smysl krátký je: Chceme, ba musíme věřit – ale komu a v co?' (Masaryk 1897, 913) (1934, 235).
Masaryk’s younger contemporary Gustav Zába (1854-1924), one of the latest Herbartists, discusses briefly Hume’s scepticism regarding causality in comparison with that of Sextus Empiricus in his Pyrrhonism (1890, 21 and 87-8).

3. Between the Wars (1920s to 1930s)

The main events in the Czech reception of Hume in the new Czechoslovakia are two books, by Tvrdý (1925) and Pelikán (1928). They both refer to Masaryk as their inspiration and guide, but they add new quality to Czech discussion of Hume, and are relevant for the general history of Hume scholarship. As to the Czechoslovak philosophical community in general, two new universities were founded in Brno and Bratislava, and there appeared, subsequently, three new philosophical journals (only one of which survived the depression in the 1930s).

Josef Tvrdý (1877-1942) studied in Prague (1896-1901), taught at a high-school, was made a lecturer in Brno university in 1922, and in 1927 became a professor in Bratislava university. He died in a Nazi concentration camp. His monograph Problém skutečnosti u Davida Huma a jeho význam v dějinách filosofie (The Problem of Reality in David Hume and its Significance in the History of Philosophy, 1925) is a serious scholarly work full of interesting observations. While Masaryk emphasized the problems of causality and induction, Tvrdý makes his topic the problem of external existence or, as he says, of reality. He says that it is the most important philosophical problem of today (1925, 3 and 89), that it was first discussed critically by Hume, to whom it was the most important philosophical problem, and that it was not solved successfully by him or by any subsequent philosopher (1925, 4, 18, 21-2).

Tvrdý plausibly criticizes Marleker (1920) whom he reports as making Hume a phenomenalist close to Berkeley (1925, 24-8 and 43-4). He rightly asserts that Hume does not doubt external existence but restricts his task to an inquiry into the origin and justification of our belief in existence (1925, 38). Hume’s great achievement is that ‘he was the first to show the importance of irrational components in cognition and to use them in dealing with the
problem of reality'. However, Hume is too careless in extending their applicability, and neglects the distinction between belief and judgement (1925, 30-31). On the whole, Hume’s main fault is his mechanistic and atomistic psychology which, moreover, suffers from its reliance on associations with the language of contemporary science, e.g. by abusing words like 'inertia' (1925, 22, 47).

Tvrdý is especially good – and often original – on historical connections. He stresses the irrationalism of Bayle as one of the three main influences on Hume, besides empiricism (culminating in Locke and Hutcheson) and science (Newton), and criticizes previous scholarship for neglecting Bayle’s influence on Hume (1925, 10-15). In particular, he considers Bayle the source of the distinction between empirical and absolute object, of Hume’s criticism of the concept of substance, of atomistic arguments against the infinite divisibility of space (1925, 39, 73, 76-7), and finds in Bayle seeds of the doctrine that even primary qualities are merely subjective as well as the model for the character of Philo in the Dialogues (1925, 42, 80). Tvrdý also discusses the influence of Gassendi’s objections to Descartes on Hume’s conception of existence (1925, 25).

As regards the influence of Hume on others, Tvrdý claims that Reid was not contradicting Hume as much as people thought; rather, Reid’s philosophy of common sense is already proposed by Hume (Tvrdý 1925, 64). Hume influenced Kant’s (1763) conception of existence as a simple, unanalysable thesis, which is not a constitutive condition of the reality of the object, and he also influenced Brentano’s conception of existential judgement (1925, 33-37). Herder learned about Hume through Hamann, but Jacobi learned independently, possibly through Reid (Tvrdý 1925, 64-6). Hume also influenced recent pluralists like Renouvier and William James (Tvrdý 1925, 51-2 and 74-5; 1929, 91).

Hume’s thought, according to Tvrdý, is rhapsodic rather than systematic (1925, 32). He offers no doctrine that can be simply accepted; rather, he teaches one to think, to search for truth. Like Socrates, he did not bequeath to posterity much in terms of firm positive doctrine, but nonetheless became one of the finest philosophical educators (1925, 90). The Treatise and the Enquiries are of equal importance (1925, 18); the differences between them include the fact that there is more room for the spontaneity of the mind in the Treatise, while

21 'že poukázal první na význam iracionálních momentů v noëtice a že zvláště jich použil při problému reality' (Tvrdý 1925, 23).
in the first Enquiry the association of ideas is the exclusive explanandum of mental phenomena (1925, 41). Tvrdý provides a solid summary and commentary to the Treatise I.iv.2 (1925, 46-51) and I.iv.3-5 (1925, 69-78).

Tvrdý has a few more things to say about Hume in his Filosofie náboženství (Philosophy of Religion, 1921), Teorie pravdy (Theories of Truth, 1929) and Logika (Logic, 1937). He proclaims Hume as the founder of both the study of religions (in NHR) and of the philosophy of religion (in D) (1921, 25-27). He discusses Hume’s view of evidence and its reception by Wundt and Russell (1929, 57-61). He claims that in his investigation of causality, Hume was influenced by ancient sceptics and by Malebranche (Tvrdý 1937, 187), and that Hume’s views of causality were, together with Mach’s, the main source of the sceptical views of causality in the Vienna Circle, as represented e.g. in Frank (1932).

To conclude, Tvrdý’s appreciation of Hume’s demonstration of the role of irrational components in cognition, together with his understanding that Hume does not doubt the existence of external things and of causal connexion between them, but only investigates the source of our belief in them, can be seen as anticipating views of Kemp Smith (1941).

Ferdinand Pelikán (1885-1952) studied in Prague and Heidelberg, taught at a high-school and in 1929 became a lecturer in Charles University in Prague. In his main work, Fikcionalism novověké filosofie, zvláště u Humea a Kanta (Fictionalism of Modern Philosophy, especially in Hume and Kant, 1928), he focuses on Hume on pp. 67-108 and 155-162. Pelikán is less interested than Tvrdý in historical connections: he views Hume as a follower of Locke and Berkeley (Pelikán 1928, 67). For him, Hume’s main question is the problem of causality, linked with the problem of external existence (1928, 73). Pelikán proceeds in two steps: first, he summarizes and comments on the parts of the Treatise which deal with the four selected topics: external existence, I.iv.2 (1928, 76-81), substance and personal identity, I.iv.5-6 (1928, 81-91), causality, I.iii.3-4 and 14-16 (1928, 94-100), and belief, I.iii.6-7 and 10 (1928, 103-7). Then, he provides a general interpretation of Hume’s philosophy (1928, 107-8 and 155-62). An earlier discussion of Hume’s view of causality, surpassed by (1928), had appeared earlier (Pelikán 1914, 349-54).

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22 Both Mach and Frank were long-standing professors at the German university in Prague, before moving to Vienna and to Harvard respectively.
Pelikán’s main point is that there is a pervasive duality in Hume, manifest in a number of particular oppositions, and rooted in the unbridgeable gap between the abstract world of reason, with its demands of identity, and the lively and continuous world of natural instinct:

We have seen [in Hume] two radically different worlds: the world of appearance and the world of things in themselves, the world of perceptions (which, however, he elsewhere ascribes reality) and the world of material objects, the world of time and the world of space, the world of the discontinuity of perceptions and the world of the continuity of the external reality – all these dualisms, this entire double epistemology is reduced in Hume to the ultimate dualism, the dualism [on the one hand] of the natural, mechanical instinct and inborn association, functioning as a kind of universal attraction […] and, on the other hand, of the discontinuous, discursive reason; these two worlds, the world of reason full of abstract and logical identity, where even personality is nothing but a logical postulate of identity of the succession of our perceptions, and where matter is a similar postulate of a succession of related objects, and on the other hand the lively world of inner affections and impressions and instincts, of loves and hatreds, wishes and needs […] – these two worlds are radically different. […] The inner world of passions is in Hume a suitable corrective to his seeming sensualism, which Hume reduces […] to absurdity. Hume’s scepticism and criticism concerns equally reason […] and senses […]. Natural instinct alone teaches us about true efficacy of the external world.23

Pelikán remarks that such a view may have escaped previous scholars because they did not pay enough attention to the second and third books of the Treatise (1928, 156). Pelikán then criticizes Hume for assuming uncritically a basic discontinuity in the realms of perceptions and of matter (1928, 161).

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23 Viděli jsme u něho dva radikálně odlišné světy: Svět zjevů a svět věcí o sobě, svět percepcí (kterým však jinde přikládá realitu) a svět hmotných objektů, svět času a svět prostoru, svět diskontinuity percepcí a svět kontinuity vnější reality – všechny tyto dualismy, celá tato dvojí noetika, redukuje se u Huma na dualism poslední, dualism přírodního, mechanického instinktu a vrozené asociace, působící jako druh universální atrakce […] a na druhé straně diskontinuitního, diskursivního rozumu: Oba světy, rozumový svět plný abstraktní a logické identity, kde I osobnost jest pouhým logickým postulátem identity sledu našich percepcí a kde i hmota jest podobným postulátem sledu relacionovaných objektů a na druhé straně živý svět vnitřních afekcí a dojmů i instinktů, lásek a nenávistí, přání a potřeb […] – jsou radikálně odlišné. […] Vnitřní svět vášní jest u něho těž vhodnou korekturou jeho zdánlivého sensualismu, který Hume přivádí […] k absurdnosti. Skepticism a kriticism Humeův týče se stejně rozumu […] jako našich smyslů […] Naproti tomu jedině přírodní instinkt poučuje nás o skutečném působení světa vnějšího’ (Pelikán 1928, 107-8).
While Tvrdý’s book is a model of sound mainstream scholarship, Pelikán’s is not: it is idiosyncratic, and not well organized. But Pelikán seems to have more philosophical concerns and can be seen as connecting, in an interesting way, elements of naturalism with a rather plausible pluralism -- he recognises that there is only limited opportunity for a unifying, harmonizing reading of Hume.

Hume is discussed also in Zbořil (1924) and (1932), Kozák (1930, 31-33) and Rádl (1933, 185-96). Josef Beneš basically repeats several of Masaryk’s insights (1933, 74-5, 118-19, 163). Ladislav Rieger returns to the reductio-ad-absurdum-of-empiricism and waking-up-of-Kant scheme (1939, 37 and 182). Among the history-of-philosophy textbooks, the best description of Hume is in Drtina (1926), who in many respects follows Masaryk: Hume is the greatest British philosopher, who exerted a massive influence on the development of modern philosophy. In epistemology, the main influence on Hume is Locke; in ethics, Shaftesbury. Oddly enough, there was not a single paper about Hume in any of the four Czech philosophical journals during this period.

4. More Recent Developments (from 1940s on)

Czech universities were closed from 1939-45, and from 1948-89 all public life, including teaching and publishing, was subject to regulation (of varying severity) by the communist authorities. Existing philosophical journals were shut down, and many academics were expelled from jobs. Hume was classified as a 'subjective idealist' by the official Marxist-Leninist philosophy, and excluded from the centrally controlled philosophy research plans, for being considered neither very dangerous nor potentially acceptable. For a long time, there was only limited interest in Hume among dissident intellectuals. For both groups, Hume was a closed and rather uncomplicated chapter in the history of philosophy. Interest in Hume began to grow again only towards the end of the 1980s.

The new translation of the first Enquiry by Vojtěch Gaja (Hume 1972) was linguistically stylish but a failure in terms of philosophical reliability. Its most striking feature in that respect is that, whilst expounding the problem of causality in Sections IV. and V., the translation fails to distinguish between 'connexion' and 'conjunction'. It begins to do so only at
the beginning of Section VII. Part 2. (in order to avoid impossibility in translating the sentence about the appearance of conjunction and no appearance of connexion), but the reader is baffled for the new term used now used for 'conjunction' has not been introduced before, and in Czech is simply a synonym of the word used earlier for both 'connexion' and 'conjunction'. The translation is accompanied by a somewhat shallow introduction (Sobotka 1972), treating Hume along the reductio-ad-absurdum and Kant-awakening lines.

Among university teachers of the epoch, Josef Macháček (1917-1984) from Brno University is reported to have had an interest in Hume. He studied in Brno with Tvrdý (until the closing down of universities in 1939), and after the war briefly (1947-48) in Edinburgh. Although he did not publish on Hume, like Seibt two centuries before, he aroused some interest in Hume through his lectures.

Macháček’s student Zdeněk Novotný (1949-) who teaches in Olomouc University discussed both in his graduation (1972) and doctoral thesis (1977) the relationship between Book I of the Treatise and the first Enquiry, agreeing largely with Kruse’s views on the topic. In 1992, he submitted a habilitation thesis on the same topic, with much additional material consisting of a survey of recent Hume scholarship in English. The thesis was published as David Hume a jeho teorie vědění (David Hume and His Theory of Knowledge, 1999), and short presentations of Novotný’s views are available in English (1994) and Czech (2003). Novotný also wrote about Hume’s views of space and time (1993).

The author of this chapter, Josef Moural (1957-), published a paper (extracts 1988, in entirety 1993) on general problems of Hume interpretation, inspired by Kemp Smith and Livingston. He submitted a research degree thesis (2001) in which he argues that there is an important development in Hume’s theory of belief between Book I of the Treatise and all that follows the Abstract, that the later doctrine is clearly preferable, and Henry Home’s criticisms in late spring 1739 possibly made Hume change his mind. Moural also provides a detailed critical analysis of Donald W. Livingston’s interpretation of Hume, and an interpretation of Treatise I.iv.2. Moural has published a new, more complete and accurate translation of the first Enquiry, with an introduction and notes (Hume 1996).

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24 ’sdružen’ (Hume 1972, 114).
25 ’spojen’, ’spojení’ (Hume 1972, 64 and passim).
James Hill, an Englishman settled in Prague in the 1990s and teaching at Prague University, wrote a paper about the difference between Hume’s naturalism in the first *Enquiry* and in the *Treatise* (1999), arguing that the naturalism in the *Treatise* is psychological and targets Pyrrhonism, whereas the naturalism in the first *Enquiry* is motivational and targets Cartesian scepticism.
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