CALIFORNIA CIVILIZATION 
AND 
EUROPEAN SPECULATIVE THOUGHT 

Three Stages

Josef Chytry 
University of California, Berkeley & California College of the Arts

Abstract 
This paper looks at California civilization and its relation to the European speculative tradition as developed in three different historical stages. The first stage concerns the emergence of Californian thinkers, primarily native son Josiah Royce and his fashioning of a philosophical idealism greatly indebted to classical German Idealism and its heirs; the second stage studies three major speculative works – Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment, Bertold Brecht’s second version of his play Galileo, and Thomas Mann’s novel Doktor Faustus – composed by European émigrés as part of the massive Central European intellectual diaspora to California during the troubled 1930s and 1940s; the third stage then completes our topic by a survey of three contemporary European thinkers -- Herbert Marcuse, Michel Foucault, and Jacques Derrida -- who developed important aspects of their thought largely as a result of the California nexus.

Contact Information: 
Professor Josef Chytry 
F402 IMIO 
Haas School of Business #1930 
University of California 
Berkeley, CA 94720 
tel 510-643-1631 
e-mail: chytry@haas.berkeley.edu

1 A first version of this paper was presented as an invited lecture at the Center for Theoretical Study, Charles University and the Czech Academy of Sciences, in Prague, Czech Republic, on 27 July 2006. I wish to express my thanks to the Center’s co-director Dr. Ivan Chvatík for his invitation and helpful comments on that version, as well as to the audience. I am also grateful to the Faculty Grants Committee of the California College of the Arts for providing indispensable financial support for my visit. The first section of the paper on Josiah Royce is a revised version of an original presentation at the Josiah Royce Celebration gathering in his home town of Grass Valley, California, on 3 June 2006. My thanks to Nevada County Librarian Steven Fjeldsted and to Librarian Judy Mariuz of the newly renamed Royce Library in Grass Valley for making possible the gathering in honor of the 150th anniversary of Royce’s birth.
“If it is remarkable when a people has become indifferent to its constitutional theory, to its sentiments, its ethical customs and virtues, it is certainly no less remarkable when a people loses its metaphysics, when the spirit which contemplates its own pure essence is no longer a present reality in the life of the nation .... Systematic philosophy and ordinary common sense thus cooperating to bring about the downfall of metaphysics, there was seen the strange spectacle of a cultured people without metaphysics – like a temple richly ornamented in other respects but without a holy of holies.”


If, as has been often trumpeted, the twentieth century was the American Century, all the more has it been the Californian Century, as a formerly peripheral state on the west coast of the United States of America arose to a ranking of anywhere between fifth and eighth economic power in the world. And if a civilization of this global status needs to display, as the Hegel citation above suggests, something like its own “metaphysics,” then the theme of California and “speculation” is worth extended consideration.

This paper looks at California civilization and its relation to the European speculative tradition as developed in three different historical stages. The first stage concerns the emergence of Californian thinkers, primarily native son Josiah Royce and his fashioning of a philosophical idealism greatly indebted to classical German Idealism and its heirs; the second stage studies three major speculative works – Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment, Bertold Brecht’s second version of his play Galileo, and Thomas Mann’s novel Doktor Faustus – composed by European émigres as part of the massive Central European intellectual diaspora to California during the troubled 1930s and 1940s; the third stage then completes our topic by a survey of three contemporary European thinkers -- Herbert Marcuse, Michel Foucault, and Jacques Derrida -- who developed important aspects of their thought largely as a result of the California nexus.

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If American philosophy begins with a single work, it is very probably the Young Emerson’s maiden essay Nature (1836), written not long after his 1832 pilgrimage to England and meetings with William Wordsworth, Samuel Taylor Coleridge and Thomas Carlyle, the British transmitters of European “transcendental” philosophy. Ralph Waldo Emerson’s “transcendentalism,” which he later clarified as philosophical Idealism tout court, marks the first strong indigenous intellectual movement that claimed American priorities, and its primary concern was to free the religious mind from outdated sectarian standards narrowly associated with Puritanism and Presbyterianism in favor of the awe-inspiring spirituality of Nature as such.

Yet Emerson’s glittering prose needed its embodiment, and it was only after meeting and befriending the younger Henry David Thoreau in 1837 that Emerson began to conceive a clearer standard of what his philosophical naturalism might portend. In turn, however, Thoreau, himself

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3 Cf. Baker [1996], 106-107..
the eventual founder of a distinctly naturalist genre of writing and speculation in America starting with *Walden* (1845-6), moved away from the more technically Idealist components of Emerson’s Nature reflections to a far more precise and detailed understanding of the lived experience of environmentality and ecosystematicity. With Thoreau, Emerson’s hopes for a new culture celebrating his advocacy of Nature were realized, but only to the degree that Emerson himself and his peculiar manner of Unitarian thinking became correspondingly outdated.

While *California* civilization is a phenomenon that easily predates the American conquest of the vast territories formerly ruled by Spain (and after 1821 by the newly independent United States of Mexico), connections with formal speculative European thought really only begin after the American annexation of 1848, linking up, as might be expected, with such threads recently woven by Emerson, Thoreau, and (after 1855) Walt Whitman. These threads are nowhere more prominent than in the transmission of the theme of a spiritual Nature from the New England Transcendentalists to the first concrete experiences of California Nature that came to be specifically associated with the discovery and celebration of the magnificent Sierra Nevada mountain range and its centerpiece, the Yosemite Valley. By the time that Emerson himself made his first and only pilgrimage to Yosemite in 1870, it was in the company of the young naturalist explorer and writer John Muir. Muir was destined to immortalize these ranges with his later eulogies of them as the “Range of Light” and the Yosemite Valley as a veritable Temple of Nature. Moreover, in practical terms, it was Muir who helped establish the first true environmentalist organization, the Sierra Club, and was largely responsible for the establishment of the Yosemite region as the first U.S. National Park. Muir’s friendship with the University of California professor and scientist Joseph LeConte, with whom he co-founded the Sierra Club, and whose own pilgrimage to Yosemite also took place in 1870, was itself followed by LeConte’s career of practical, theoretical and spiritual geological celebration of Nature as California’s unique gift to the American-European imagination. The LeConte connection meant that Muir’s naturalist philosophy had its academic counterpart in LeConte’s influence on a future generation of California students, academics and scientists along comparable lines.

Among those students first graduating from the University of California at its campus in Berkeley and assiduously attending LeConte’s lectures, Josiah Royce was a product of the Gold Rush immigration to California after 1848. Born in the mining town of Grass Valley, California, in 1855, Royce’s professional career is the first clear case of academic or “technical” philosophy triumphant in the United States as Royce helped establish the preeminence of the faculty of philosophy at Harvard University between 1885 and his death in 1916. The formal basis of Royce’s reputation was his development of an American brand of philosophical Idealism that owed a great deal to the stimulus of his year of study (1875-6) at the German universities of Heidelberg, Leipzig, and Göttingen, the latter location allowing him to follow in particular the

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4 Cf. Chytry [2006a] and [2006b].
5 Baker [1996], 490-491.
7 Starr [1973], 425-428.
8 Cf. Kuklick [1977].
lectures of Rudolf Hermann Lotze.⁹ A convinced Germanophile (at least until what he regarded as the unpardonable German act of sinking the neutral ship Lusitania in 1915),¹⁰ Royce was originally forced to pursue his career on the young campus at Berkeley as an English instructor before his new friend William James, the future founder of American philosophical pragmatism, helped him shift to Harvard after 1882. Hence the first genuine formal philosophical voice coming out of California is Royce’s German Idealism, drawing above all on Kant (“the good father,” in Royce’s homage)¹¹ and later the Hegel of the Phenomenology of Spirit.¹²

Ultimately the German Idealist in Royce formulated what he himself came to dub a “constructive Idealism,”¹³ closely affiliated with James’ pragmatic bent while remaining committed to the primacy of a systemic totality that Royce learned from Hegel’s historical dialectics.¹⁴ This Idealism permitted Royce to retain the religious dimension of “God” or the “Absolute” in a philosophizing that – inspired both by Lotze and by LeConte – simultaneously accorded a speculative approbation to the Darwinian theory of Evolution as a more scientific articulation of the “romantic” philosophy of nature (Naturphilosophie) of the original Idealists Schelling and Hegel.¹⁵

For our theme, most interesting is what Royce learned from the Germany of his day as his cultural standard. Not only did Royce call upon the tradition of German philosophical Idealism for his speculative method, but he also drew on the Germany of the Goethezeit for his standard of what a truly civilized mode of being might be like in terms of converging thought and community.¹⁶ This Germany – specifically the Weimar and Jena of Goethe and Schiller – showed both a commitment toward literature and the arts and toward protracted speculative thinking;¹⁷ and this proved the standard that Royce’s later advocacy both of “Provincialism” (the standard of regional enlivenment in cultural and creative practices) and of the “Absolute” (the goal and reality of speculative thought) meant to serve. Goethe and Kant – rather than Goethe or,

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¹¹ Kuklick [1977], 144.

¹² Cf. Royce’s early notes for 1878-1882 in Royce [1920]. Also his continued admiration for this work which he taught regularly between 1889 and 1898. Cited in Clendenning [1985], 230. Royce [1964] is a continuous celebration of this work.

¹³ Royce [1893], 235, 269.

¹⁴ Thus Royce claimed: “I may assert that personally I am both a pragmatist and an absolutist.” Royce [1964], 258.

¹⁵ “The doctrine of evolution, I assert, is in heart and essence the child of the romantic movement itself.” Royce [1893], 291; also xii.

¹⁶ For Royce gazing upon the Goethezeit: “Philosophy and life were then in far closer touch than, as I fear, they are today in the minds of many people.” Royce [1964], 64.

¹⁷ For Royce’s rhapsodic account of this period 1750-1805, and especially 1795-1805 (the peak of the Goethe-Schiller friendship), cf. Royce [1893], 170-171.
Kant – must be called upon to inspire Californians whose characteristic weakness of excessive individualism (the fault so glaringly exposed by the Gold Rush origins of American California) should be countered by more convivial and social tendencies toward “community.” As Royce claimed shortly before his death, “I strongly feel that my deepest motives and problems have centered about the Idea of the Community.”

How specifically did this Roycean speculative thought impinge on his reading of Californian civilization? The author of two early books on California – one a novel *The Feud at Oakfield Creek* (1885) subtitled “A Novel of California Life” – and the other *California* (1886) – the first critical interpretation of California history -- Royce remained obsessed with the unique traits of California Nature as the key toward imagining a California civilization. In a later essay, “The Pacific Coast” (dated 1898, published 1908), which Royce explicitly marked as a continuation of his *California History* book, Royce returned to his younger euphoric reflections on the redemptive qualities of California Nature.

What made California Nature unique, according to the older Royce, was a “kindly nature” based on the predictable character of weather, including the long period of drought, mild climate and definite routine. It was a Nature that encouraged being grasped or visualized at a glance, with open clear views and outlines. Hence a peculiarly “intimate” relation between humans and Nature followed, augmented by a sense of geographical isolation from the rest of the North American continent: California was not just an extension of the American West.

Accordingly, California could be conducive to what Royce called a “harmonious individuality of the Hellenic type.” Royce approvingly quoted an American east coast friend who experienced fin de siècle Californians as akin to the Homeric Greeks of the *Odyssey* for their independence of judgment, carelessness of what outsiders might think of them, freedom in choosing what they wanted to be, and cultivating a ready and confident speech. This distinctly Californian individuality did carry its dangers, Royce conceded, but at its best it meant people who were not easily caught up in enthusiasms and false prophets. Admittedly, California was no longer so isolated as a result of the new transcontinental railway connections and accompanying interweavings with the new U.S. industrial and world economies. Thus Royce concluded that the story of future Californian civilization would be the California bred by the Californian’s intimacy with Nature in the sense described above and the economic-technological global forces bringing in values from the American eastern seaboard and the rest of the world. At its best, however, this relation to nature would continue to produce emotionally exciting and intimate relations to breed the “sensitive” Californian in what Royce baptized as “provincial California.”

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18 Royce [1969], i, 34.

19 Note that for Royce the Idealist, the “Californian’s well-known and largely justified glorification of his climate” remained “the same expression of his tendency to idealize whatever tended to make his community, and all its affairs, seem unique, beloved, and deeply founded upon some significant natural basis.” Royce [1908], 70 (emphasis added).

20 Royce [1908], vii.

21 Royce [1908], 205.

22 Royce took pride in the “rapid evolution of the genuine provincial spirit in my own state.” Royce [1908], 70.
How does this reading of California civilization relate to Royce’s commitment to the age of German Idealism and its future unfolding in America? Although Royce played with the idea of a book on Hegel at one time, his real hero was Goethe and he even entered into negotiations with a press to publish a book on Goethe. The serious student of Goethe knows that the critical moment in Goethe’s life came when the latter went down to Italy and Sicily in 1786 and experienced a metamorphosis in which he thought he directly intuited the Homeric Greeks of the Odyssey, particularly the hallowed isle of the Phaiakaians and the “magical garden” of their King Alkinous. Goethe then returned to his Weimer home and attempted to create a new Hellenic culture on German soil. This is all part of the complicated story of German culture-making in a Hellenizing direction which Goethe’s Idealist admirers such as Schelling and Hegel supported, the creation of what Goethe’s ally, the poet Schiller -- on whom young Royce wrote extensively --, called the ideal of the “aesthetic state of the beauteous shine.”

And this was the kind of ideal bringing together the formal philosophy of German Idealism and the cultural-social goals of German Romantics and Classicists for Royce. From this perspective then, California had a unique role to play in bringing forth a Hellenic-Goethean civilization equally at home in “romantic” creativeness and Idealist speculation. Thanks to the intimate relation between the Californian individual and the Californian Nature, a sensitivity could arise reminiscent of the German Romantic sensibility that would nonetheless mature to a more serious scientific-evolutionary understanding of the meaning of Nature, which Royce proclaimed as the intention or realization of Spirit as such.

As a young boy in Grass Valley, Royce had looked forth with his elder sister upon the distant blue mountains of the Coastal Range, dreaming of the oceanic realms beyond. Growing up, he embarked on a lifetime articulation of what this intimacy with the real California – what we have called California Nature – entailed. Saturated in the model of the Goethezeit that presumably had united speculation and community, Royce later looked back and remembered this Grass Valley as his first taste of what he called “a new community.” At the end of his life Royce, who thought of himself as a “non-conformist disposed to a certain rebellion,” hoped that he would be remembered as the metaphysical philosopher of the Idea of Community for this California civilization in the making.

The second stage in the interrelationship of European speculative thought with the evolution of California civilization owes a great deal to the Californian creation of

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23 After his 1891 work The Spirit of Modern Philosophy, Royce planned a study of Goethe. He even signed a contract with the Century Company to write six articles as the basis for the biography. Clendenning [1985], 190.


25 “The world is the process of the spirit.” Royce [2001], 381. Also 401 for Royce’s reaffirmation of his commitment to philosophical idealism.

26 Royce [1969], i, 34; Royce [1908], 172-173.

27 Royce [1969], i, 31. Royce’s final thoughts were concerned with his ideal of the “universal community” or “the beloved community.” Royce [1958], 55; Royce [2001], 75-98, 376.

28 Royce [1969], i, 29.
“Hollywood,” that complex of cinematic and related literary and media industries constituting the “film business.”

As home to the California film industry, the city of Hollywood had become by 1915, after it had been incorporated into Los Angeles proper, the site for its “movies” — originally referring to both the actors as well as the products of the newest of genres emerging out of modern technology. By the 1920s something like a studio system was fully in operation, but it was really only after 1929 with the technical achievement of the “talkies” that the big five of the studio system succeeded in driving out smaller rivals through their incestuous interconnection of finance, industry, and the “creative” fields needed to fabricate “stardom.”

The emergence of Hollywood as a distinctly twentieth-century sector of technological productivity belongs to the larger story of the astonishing growth of the California economy during that period. Besides film, this California proved at the cutting edge of a variety of industries, including oil, automobiles, agribusiness, real estate and water economics. By the 1920s the Greater Los Angeles area, already third in population behind New York and Chicago, was developing into the most distinctively twentieth-century metropolis in the world.

During these founding decades Greater Los Angeles had proved a magnet for European talent, but until Hitler’s assumption of power in Germany in 1933 it is fair to say that the Anglo component was the most marketable of that European presence. After 1933, however, Central Europeans — both Jewish and non-Jewish — were driven for a variety of reasons — ethnic, political, and creative — to American shores, and through the prospect often of Hollywood employment — or at least through friends and relatives benefitting from such employment — ended up creating the cultural equivalent of Berlin and Vienna (as well as Prague and Budapest) in the interconnected communal spaces of Hollywood, Santa Monica, Pacific Palisades, and — more rarely — Beverly Hills. Thomas Mann, that eminently German representative of the Central European diaspora, was only slightly exaggerating when he speculated that not even the Weimar of Goethe and Schiller could match such an assemblage of German-speaking intellectuals.

The larger implications of this rush of Central European talent into the film industry and its environs have been treated in a variety of studies, some more scholarly than others. Fascinating as that subject is, the speculative contributions of the diaspora have received less attention. And yet the obvious fact remains that at least three major works in the history of twentieth-century European thought were conceived and completed in this region of greater Los Angeles dominated by Hollywood and its technological tributaries: Bertold Brecht’s Galileo; Thomas Mann’s Doktor Faustus; and Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment — all more or less connected importantly with the annus mirabilis of 1947, a

29 For early efforts at a serious appraisal of the Hollywood industry, cf. Rosten [1941] and Powdermaker [1950]; also Mordden [1988] for a history of the major Hollywood studios. The best recent study of Hollywood as “a central point of reference in the cultural economy of the modern world” in terms of being “one of the most highly developed agglomerations of productive activity anywhere, and a major urban phenomenon in its own right,” is Scott [2005], 175, xi.

30 “The notion of Los Angeles/Hollywood as Berlin or Vienna in exile is not far-fetched.” Starr [1997], 342; also 347-348.

31 Cf. Cook [1983], 58.

32 I have chosen to concentrate on these three major works, although it is also worth mentioning Horkheimer’s Eclipse of Reason, Adorno’s Minima Moralia and essays on modern music, and Mann’s Joseph and His Brothers, as
year which unfortunately also marked the onset of a new Californian and American anti-Communist fervor, as emblematised that fall by the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC) hearings on the Hollywood Ten (to which Brecht was a European “eleventh”), that stamped an end to the creative interchange of progressive European speculation with its California receptacle.

Although students of Brecht, the Frankfurt School, and Mann have marked the fact of an American exile in their respective careers, there has been a perhaps less keen recognition of the exactness of the shared time that they experienced specifically in forties California. For example, Mann arrived in California in March 1941; Horkheimer in April; Herbert Marcuse (also a member of the Frankfurt School who will play a major role in our third stage) in May/June; Brecht in July; and Adorno by the end of November. Each, of course, followed very different itineraries to reach California – that of Brecht from Helsinki to San Pedro Harbor via the Trans-Siberian railway being undoubtedly the most spectacular – but all in effect chose the same Los Angeles reality – to be precise, Santa Monica and the Pacific Palisades – for the temporary home in which they would embark almost at the same precise time on their respective contributions to Central European speculation on the crisis of the fascist period.

Thus, beginning in 1938 Adorno and Horkheimer foresaw a project vaguely directed toward a new work on speculative dialectic, or dialectical logic, in the tradition of Hegel and Marx; but it was only once they were in mutual physical proximity in California that by late 1941 they were well on their way to the early key chapters of what became the Dialectic of Enlightenment project (originally called Philosophical Fragments, the present subtitle of the book). Crucial financial help from a Jewish organization helped swing the project by 1943 to its bold speculations on the origins and character of Anti-Semitism, and by May 1944 the work was available in a monographical version: the preface to that version is dated “Los Angeles, California.” In fact, the final version published by Querido of Amsterdam in 1947 only includes one substantial addition in the chapter on Anti-Semitism.

For his part, Brecht, seeking to break into both films in Hollywood and plays on Broadway in New York, embarked on a major revision of his 1938 Galileo play. By December 1944 the new version was available in German, and through his friendship with Hollywood actor Charles Laughton (who would play Galileo in the first production of 1947) embarked on an English translation that was more or less completed by December 1945 (Brecht habitually added minor touches to his plays right up to production) and enjoyed its premiere at the Coronet Theatre in Hollywood in July 1947.

Finally, Mann, who since 1904 had been vaguely playing out the idea of his own version of the Faust legend as part of his assumption of Goethe’s mantle in German Kultur, took off on well as Brecht’s reworking of the major body of his theatrical works.

33 Wiggershaus [1986], 202, 214.

34 The original title of the first chapter, “Dialectic of Enlightenment,” became the overall book title while that chapter was then retitled “The Concept of Enlightenment.”

35 The addition was mainly by Frankfurt School colleague Leo Löwenthal, later professor of sociology at the University of California, Berkeley. Löwenthal had helped write the prior sections of this part.

36 Following Cook [1983], 165-181. Also Brecht [1993], 358 (1 December 1945).
his most German novel *Doktor Faustus* in the spring of 1943, right after the completion of the last leg of his massive *Joseph and his Brothers* tetralogy. Between January and late February of 1945 Mann completed the all-important twenty-fifth chapter that “records” the dialogue between his protagonist and the Devil, and managed to finish the whole work by early 1947.\(^{37}\)

All three works, notwithstanding their obvious membership in the German-language tradition, were almost from the start intricately connected with plans for English versions. Besides Brecht’s uncharacteristic eagerness to befriend and exploit Charles Laughton for that purpose\(^{38}\) – which actually led to the first production of the second version of *Galileo* in English rather than German – Mann worked from the start with his English translator, Helen T. Lowe-Porter, even while he composed the original German text, in order that her English version would come out simultaneously.\(^{39}\) It is clear from comments in the text itself that Mann, then a U.S. citizen, was almost thinking more of an American English-speaking audience than a German.\(^{40}\) Finally, Horkheimer made every effort -- albeit unsuccessfully -- to provide an early English translation of at least the key chapter, “The Culture Industry [Kulturindustrie]: Enlightenment as Mass Deception,” even as he and Adorno spun out the body of heterogeneous topics that became the manuscript of *Dialectic of Enlightenment*.\(^{41}\)

No doubt much of this concern for immediately available English versions reflected the exiles’ temporary uncertainty over the future during these difficult years of German domination of Europe, the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, the U.S. entry into the war against National Socialism in late 1941, and even the increasing assurance by 1944 of the favorable course of that campaign; indeed, some exiles, such as Mann himself, became U.S. citizens during this period. But it also reflected the authors’ positive valuations of the importance for an English-reading audience of the results of their respective labors at the very moment that the United States was emerging as the one undisputed superpower. The ominous political turn toward a virulent anti-Communism in America after 1947 proved a shock to the émigrés for whom America had largely implied the strongly welfare-state and European-internationalist policies of Franklin Roosevelt’s America in which our authors originally undertook to complete their works. Not surprisingly, this dramatic turn in the political climate of the late 1940s helped hasten their permanent departure to new or reinstituted European homes.

How then do these works fit into our theme? First, let us consider their target audience. All three probe the challenge of German fascism by attempting the most broad-ranging analyses and critiques of the overall problematic of what Adorno and Horkheimer call the “program of the

\(^{37}\) Mann [1992], 39.

\(^{38}\) For Brecht’s own account of working with Laughton on the translation, cf. Brecht [1993], 338-339 (December 1944). Brecht mentions that the biggest difficulty is translating Galileo’s Scene 1 speech about the “new time” (339). Also 348 (14 May 1945).

\(^{39}\) Starr notes that “rarely has an important work of art been composed in such a condition of simultaneous translation.” Starr [1997], 388.

\(^{40}\) Mann’s narrator in fact confesses at the end of *Doktor Faustus* that the text is meant more for an American audience, a point noted by his translator in her introduction to the book. Mann [1948b], v; Mann [1948a], 764.

\(^{41}\) Rabinbach [1997], 167. Wiggershaus [1986], 764, points out that this shows how much the authors longed for a[n] “US-amerikanischen Publikum.”
Enlightenment.” Certainly, all three works remain wedded to the primacy of thinking. Brecht’s Galileo was meant to be part of a “propaganda for thinking,” and originally Galileo himself was positively presented as a “Schweikian” Galileo in tribute to the Czech fictional character who outsmarts his enemies through adaptability and cunning. Meanwhile Mann’s narrator Serenus Zeitbloom is presented throughout as an eloquent defender of the classical humanist tradition of thought. And Adorno and Horkheimer assure their reader that their critique of the Enlightenment will be followed by a positive notion of enlightenment, the never achieved “Rescuing the Enlightenment [Rettung der Aufklärung]” project, although as Rolf Wiffershaus has argued, three later individual works succeed in part in realizing that project: Horkheimer’s Eclipse of Reason (also conceived and executed in California), Marcuse’s Eros and Civilization, and Adorno’s Negative Dialectics. Still, these works draw much of their deserved reputation from the severity of their attacks on the conventional European Enlightenment tradition.

Of these the one by Adorno and Horkheimer is the best known, not least for its memorable rhetoric: “The fully enlightened earth radiates disaster triumphant. The program of the Enlightenment was the disenchantment of the world [Entzauberung der Welt],” and this “disenchantment of the world” is nothing less than the “extirpation [Ausrottung]” of animism. Aiming at mastery “over a disenchanted nature,” science and technology – “the essence of this knowledge” through computation (mathematics) and utility – only seeks to know in order to exploit nature and thus dominate both nature at large and humanity: “Power and knowledge are synonymous.”

In Mann’s case the charge against Enlightenment is subtly entwined into the career of his main character Adrian Leverkühn (from the Nietzschean motto “Leben kühn,” or “Live boldly”), a musician whose father belongs to the tradition of Central European Naturphilosophie, the tradition of entering into the secrets of Nature by “tempting” her to reveal her secrets through the alchemical and magical arts. But what for the father was a mystical quest moderated by reverence – and to that extent is in the spirit of Comenius and Johann Valentin Andreae in the seventeenth century – is regarded by the son as a laughing matter, even though he himself is drawn to the archetype of the Hetaera Esmeralda, a transparent butterfly which loves shades,

42 In California Brecht continued work on his long-term project “Schweik in the Second World War.” Cook [1983], 136.

43 This is clear from Zeitbloom’s introduction of himself in Mann [1948b], 7ff., and contrapuntally reiterated throughout the text.

44 Rabinbach [1997], 171, 197; Wiggershaus [1986], 6-7. The authors themselves stressed that their critique of enlightenment “is intended to prepare the way for a positive notion of enlightenment which will release it from entanglement in blind domination.” Horkheimer & Adorno [2002], xvi.

45 Horkheimer & Adorno [2002], 3, 5; [1969], 7, 8. Incidentally the same word “Ausrottung” is later used in the authors’ excursion into the “Elements of Anti-semitism” in the claim that for fascists the Jews are not a minority but the “negative principle” on whose “extirpation” [Ausrottung] the happiness of the world presumably depends. Horkheimer & Adorno [1969], 151.

46 Horkheimer & Adorno [2002], 4.

47 Cf. Mann [1948b], 13-20; also 132 on “the hermetic laboratory, the gold-kitchen: composition.”
symbolic of an impure, albeit diabolically tempting Philosopher’s Stone.\textsuperscript{48} Leverkühn finds his alchemical equivalent in the world of tones – music – but a music that abandons the homophonic-melodic tradition of bourgeois humanism for the elementality of the equality of all tones – the triumph of dissonance – which will usher in a new age that no longer distinguishes between culture and barbarism but sees reason and magic as one.\textsuperscript{49} In effect, Leverkühn is the quintessential German-Nietzschean seeker of the power of pure creation by his pact with the Satan within him. Lacking human warmth he embodies the psychological poles of pure intellectuality and pure instinct; hence, in exchange for the capacity to create works of startling genius, he is denied “love,” that is, desire with human warmth.\textsuperscript{50} As his devil easily perceives, Leverkühn’s intellectual coldness drives him to his deepest yearning: “the aphrodisiacum of the brain [das Aphrodisiacum des Hirns].”\textsuperscript{51} And he gets it, in the “little sea maid’s knifelike pains,” i.e. syphilis.\textsuperscript{52} A complicated set of rhetorical moves, Mann’s stance toward the Enlightenment might be summed up thus: a bourgeois humanist voice that is sensitive but impotent, a creative side that is powerful but blasphemous.

Finally, there is Brecht’s Galileo, character and work. In the 1938 version of his play Galileo was the cunning Schweikian opponent of absolutism – whether in its seventeenth-century Church Inquisitorial garb or in 1930s Nazi fulminations – who outsmarted his opponents to eventually publish the truth of the new astronomy and physics.\textsuperscript{53} The 1947 California version is instead the archetypal scientist who sells out the dignity of science to authority in order to be able to create atomic technology for a new barbarism. Brecht’s new Galileo thus fits in with Mann’s as well as Adorno and Horkheimer’s condemnation of the rationality of the Enlightenment to the extent it reduces knowledge to power and power to domination over a “disenchanted” nature.

How then do these stances touch on the California environment in which they were conceived, developed and completed? The California of the 1920s and 1930s was already seen by its indigenous writers as manifesting two outstanding traits. On the one hand, there was the continued fascination with its clear, keen nature and its unparalleled fertility, displayed in its agribusiness and more lately augmented by Southern Californian experimentations in flora and fruits made possible by the completion of the massive Owens Valley water project in 1913. On the other hand, writers explored the spectacle of an entirely new style of life associated with the automobile, highways, supermalls, motels, and drive-in diners: in short, mass-culture paradise.\textsuperscript{54}

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\textsuperscript{48} Mann [1948b], 14, 142, 232, 498.
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\textsuperscript{49} Mann [1948b], 46-47, 193, 194. “Vernunft und Magie ... begegnen sich wohl und werden eins in dem, was man Weisheit, Einweihung nennt.” Mann [1948a], 302. It is known that Mann wrote these difficult musicological passages by conferring with Adorno and later had to explain its dependence on neighbor Arnold Schönberg’s twelve-tone system. Schönberg lived in financial modesty in Santa Monica. Mann [1948b], 511.
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\textsuperscript{50} “…eine Liebe, der man die animalische Wärme entzogen hat.” Mann [1948a], 113. Mann [1948b], 147, 69, 132.
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\textsuperscript{51} Mann [1948b], 248, [1948a], 384.
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\textsuperscript{52} Mann [1948b], 352, also 249, [1948a], 539.
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\textsuperscript{53} Cook [1983], 13.
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\textsuperscript{54} Cf. the excellent account in Starr [1990].
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Both features betray the turn to what would now be called post-industrial technology: from leisure wear and stylistics, media, aviation, and services to the physics, astronomy and jet propulsion achievements that would eventually produce the computer economy of Silicon Valley. In short, serious issues of individualism, anomie, and simulacrum had already surfaced; but along with such concerns came the more exhilarating sense of being able to entirely recreate or refashion the self.\

These features clearly infiltrate our three texts. Whatever its fragmentary tendencies, *Dialectic of Enlightenment* owes its narrative cohesion to the relation between the opening chapter on the concept of the Enlightenment and the latter’s contemporary manifestation in chapter two as the “culture industry” (*Kulturindustrie*) of “mass consumption.” Although Adorno and Horkheimer’s analysis of this “culture industry” is meant universally, its entire tone depends on features of the California media industry, particularly films, but also radio, magazines, and even television. Any statistical listing of specific references in that chapter would give precedence to California phenomena: from Greer Garson, Betty Davis and Donald Duck to Orson Welles and that girl in the sweater (“den Busen im Sweater”), presumably Lana Turner. Such specificity is hardly surprising, given that both Adorno and Horkheimer enjoyed a privileged view of a mass society in the making, along with personal daily contact with fellow Central Europeans who made their lives in these industries.

Brecht was, of course, one of these. He had hoped to break into the industry, although his only success was his script for Fritz Lange’s *Hangmen Also Die* (1943) based on the Czech resistance movement that brought down the S.S. leader Reinhard Heydrich -- until, that is, the *Galileo* premiere of 1947 that led to a Broadway production that fall and winter. As a Marxist, Brecht of course professed to be appalled by these fatuous stages of what Adorno and Horkheimer termed “late capitalism” (*Spätkapitalismus*). Brecht’s prior “America” had been the Chicago gangsterism he had exploited for his earlier play *The Rise and Fall of the City of Mahagonny*. Now he was right in the midst of L.A., this “Tahiti in the form of a big city” as he disdainfully called it, preferring to hang out in familiar proletariat industrial districts of the San Pedro Harbor docks. L.A. after all was already seen by its own writers as the classic “laissez-

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55 Starr [1997], 296ff.

56 In terms of the major divisions in the book, the intervening sections on the Odyssey and deSade’s Juliette are explicitly catalogued as “excursus” one and two, and the chapter on Anti-Semitism is a later edition. The final aphorisms are simply added on.


58 Unfortunately for Brecht’s Dreams of Broadway, he had already fled America -- and the tentacles of the House Committee on Un-American Activities -- beforehand. Brecht’s journals record that in the morning of 31 October 1947 he had an amiable meeting with Laughton who was donning “his galileo beard” and that in the afternoon he Brecht was “taking off for Paris.” Brecht [1993], 372.

59 Horkheimer & Adorno [1969], 138. Brecht begins his stay by whining about “this mausoleum of easy going.” Brecht [1993], 157 (1 August 1941, emphasis in original).

60 Brecht [1993], 199 (9 August 1941). Brecht goes on: “they have nature here, indeed, since everything is so artificial, they even have an exaggerated feeling for nature.” Brecht’s physical discomfort in a climate “with no seasons” is relayed on 21 January 1942 (193).

Die Stadt is nach den Engeln genannt
Und man begegnet allenthalben Engeln.
Sie riechen nach Öl und tragen goldene Pessare
Und mit blauen Ringen um die Augen
Füttern sie allmorgendlich die Schreiber in ihren

61 Starr [1997], 364.
Schwimmpfählen.\textsuperscript{62}

\textsuperscript{62} Cf. “Hollywood-Elegien,” in Brecht [1967], 849-850. As an interpreter of these poems notes, these “bitter and aggressive epigrams are only peripherally elegies.” Whitaker [1985], 160. In his journals of the period Brecht notes that one critic looking at these elegies is struck by their detachment (“as if they had been written from Marx”) but both conclude that this detachment is a general product of anyone living in L.A. Brecht [1993], 257 (20 September 1942). Kurt Eisler, for whom the elegies were composed, performed them for a small group including Herbert Marcuse (3 October 1942).
And for all his complaining, Brecht did refashion his *Galileo* there as his greatest triumph: its Hollywood premiere turned out to be the ultimate gathering of émigré Los Angeles and the Best of Hollywood, from Lionel Feuchtwanger and Igor Stravinsky to Charles Boyer, Ingrid Bergman, and Charlie Chaplin. And in terms of thematics, the great change in the California Galileo came to Brecht, as he himself stated, with the onset of the atomic age in 1945 and the dangers of a science gone wild, right in the midst of a civilization that was at the cutting edge of these very same innovations: from jet propulsion at Cal Tech and the new astronomy of Edwin Hubble at Mount Wilson and Mount Palomar observatories that proved the existence of multiple galaxies and an expanding universe, to Ernest Lawrence’s cyclotron at Berkeley in tandem with Robert Oppenheimer’s work as director of the Manhattan Project. This all funnels into the most important change of the new *Galileo*, namely Galileo’s self-denunciation in the penultimate act ascribing to his own cowardice a standard of scientific subservience that breaks up the progressive possibilities of an alliance between science and human emancipation.

The case of Mann’s relation to Southern California society is more diffuse. For him as a writer, this California was Weimar in exile: a Central European could live out his entire day speaking and hearing only German. Mann, who of all our figures spent the longest period in California from 1941 to 1952, exploited this situation to experiment with the German language. As his daughter Monica later recounted, the “odd elegance of that distant shore, with its almost intangible beauty and worldly barrenness,” deeply influenced his work and his beliefs: as his narrator concludes, the “democracy of the western lands [die Demokratie der Westländer]” was to be “after all essentially in the line of human progress”: this “western democracy is after all capable, by its own nature, of a transition into conditions more justified of life.”

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63 “Despite all the complaining and bitterness of Brecht’s Los Angeles years, the *Galileo* he co-authored with Laughton may very well be his masterpiece.” Starr [1997], 365.

64 “The atomic age made its debut over Hiroshima in the middle of our work. Overnight the biography of the founder of the new system of physics read differently.” Brecht, cited in Eric Bentley’s “introduction” to Brecht [1966], 16.

65 Brecht [1966], 123-124, concluding:: “Any man who does what I have done must not be tolerated in the ranks of science.” In a conversation on the work dated 30 July 1945 Brecht notes its emergent theme of the “decisive difference” between “scientific progress pure and simple” and science’s social and revolutionary progress.” Brecht [1993], 350. On 20 September 1945 still working with Laughton on the play, Brecht states that “the atom bomb has, in fact, made the relationship between society and science into a life-and-death-problem” (355).

66 Cook [1983], 57ff.

67 Monica Mann, cited in Starr [1997], 379. Mann [1948b], 340, [1948a], 521. Mann’s positive view, it should also noted, did not survive the postwar Californian anti-communism in which the FBI even targeted him as a friend of communism. The chagrined Mann moved permanently to Switzerland in 1952 where he died in 1955. Perhaps Mann’s project of a Hollywood novel would have dealt more directly with the L.A. of Brecht and the Frankfurt School.
If California provoked our authors to digest these latest stages of industrial society, the other aspect – California Nature – helped them sustain an intuition for a redeemed Nature. Even Brecht, notwithstanding his constant complaints about Southern Californian nature, could not resist the paradisiacal side of his friend Charles Laughton’s sumptuous garden, as shown in Brecht’s 1944 poem “Garden in Progress.”\[^{68}\] Mann remained in love with his garden and home in the Pacific Palisades, an affection that not only permeates the last of his Joseph novels, *Joseph the Provider*, entirely composed in California, but also helped him articulate the “uncanny” Nature of Father and Son Leverkühn in *Doktor Faustus*. \[^{69}\]

Finally Horkheimer found “nature in Southern California as more beautiful, the climate more favorable, than one could dream,” while Adorno, clearly no fan of its cultural ramifications, recognized the “immensity” in the beauty of the landscape: “even the smallest of its segments is inscribed, as its expression, with the immensity of the whole country.”\[^{70}\]

In short, as Mann’s daughter noted, “the gleaming emptiness, monotony, and hostility of the landscape” pushed our authors to exploit resources within themselves that might have lain dormant in a more predictable Europe.\[^{71}\] To this extent, their creative outlook in California echoes Josiah’s Royce’s admiration for the speculative possibilities inherent in dwelling within California nature. Straddled between such natural clarity and inspiration on one hand and the burgeoning of the new society of mass consumption and “late capitalism” on the other, between 1944 and 1947 Brecht, Mann, and Adorno and Horkheimer were enabled to shape permanently challenging oeuvres to a devastated and culpable Germany.

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If a burgeoning anti-Communism in California and the United States frightened large numbers of the Central European diaspora into permanent departures by the late 1940s, the 1950s proved an even more difficult period of social and political conservatism and quietism. It was therefore only through the upheavals of the 1960s, particularly intense in California (which by 1962 had become the most populous state in the American Union), that a third and closing phase of active exchange between European speculative thought and the evolution of California civilization can be traced.

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\[^{69}\] In his own words, Mann was enchanted by “the light, by the special fragrance of the air, by the blue of the sky, the exhilarating ocean breeze, the spruceness and cleanliness of the Southland.” Cited in Starr [1997], 378; also 379.

\[^{70}\] Cited in Wiggershaus [1986], 329. Adorno cited in Israel [1997], 95. This entire article is devoted to a study of Adorno’s “gratitude” toward America, which in terms of personal living experience basically meant Southern California.

\[^{71}\] Cited in Starr [1997], 379.
This third phase may be termed that of “theory” in a sense somewhat broader than Critical Theory since it would include not only the contributions of the Critical Theory tradition proper, but also poststructuralism and deconstruction. The three figures encapsulating this third phase represent some of the most original expressions of these three modes of critical thought: Herbert Marcuse (1898-1979), Michel Foucault (1927-1984), and Jacques Derrida (1930-2004).

With regard to Herbert Marcuse, it has already been noted that Marcuse joined his colleagues Adorno and Horkheimer in 1941 in Los Angeles. Unfortunately for Marcuse, notwithstanding his earnest wish to stay and work particularly with Horkheimer on their earlier aims of a new dialectical logic – one reason for his inclusion after 1934 in the Frankfurt School –, Marcuse decided to accept a position offered in Washington, DC, in 1942 when it was clear that the Frankfurt School funds were temporarily strapped, and went on to work for the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), predecessor to the future Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), as part of the U.S. government’s campaign against Germany and on behalf of eventual denazification. After the war, Marcuse remained on the American east coast to work and teach at Columbia and Brandeis universities where he eventually produced two important products of Critical Theory: Marcuse’s own “dialectic of enlightenment” addendum, Eros and Civilization (1955), and the work that established Marcuse’s academic and political notoriety, One-Dimensional Man (1964). As a result, Marcuse was offered, and accepted, a post at the San Diego campus of the University of California, moving to California by 1965 and helping to launch the speculative branch of the sixties protest movement in California and elsewhere.

Marcuse’s California years were marked by a body of work that both established him at the forefront of American radical thought and temporarily made him the object of a number of threats by political reactionaries in the Southland. An Essay on Liberation (1969), Counterrevolution and Revolt (1972), and Marcuse’s closing aesthetics, The Aesthetic Dimension (titled Die Permanenz der Kunst in German) (1978), form only part of Marcuse’s voluminous writing and lecturing both in the US and in Europe, at a time when banners in the 1968 Paris uprisings proclaimed the forthcoming age of “Marx, Mao, and Marcuse.”

Fervently pursuing the task of formulating the concept of a new revolutionary subject that would supplant and replace the classic Marxist proletariat class, Marcuse proved the only member of the original Frankfurt School to become enthusiastically a political activist. In this endeavor, Marcuse drew deeply on his new and final California home.


73 At San Diego, Marcuse assumed “his new role as the philosophical idol of militant youth.” Hughes [1975], 181.

74 Marcuse’s enthusiasm is reflected in his comments on the 1968 student movement: “The radical utopian character of their demands far surpasses the hypotheses of my essay,” and: “No matter whether their action was a revolt or an abortive revolution, it is a turning point.” Marcuse [1969], 11.
Perhaps the most apt evidence of the role of California in Marcuse’s New Left thought is the chapter “The New Sensibility” in An Essay on Liberation. Building on his earlier fusion of Marx and Freud in the call for a solution to the “dialectic of civilization” through the Schillerian ideal of “the aesthetic state,” Marcuse drew on the events of the California sixties, from the Free Speech Movement in Berkeley to the emergence of a counterculture and political protest against the Vietnam war, to envisage an “aesthetic ethos of socialism” in the making that, he claimed, was engaged in the praxis of a new revolutionary subject freed from the external and internal impositions of domination. Undeterred by the short-term defeats of the movement in 1968-9, Marcuse went on to exhort the New Left to extend the “new sensibility” to the level of everyday life and the “long march through the institutions.” While the conventional struggles against dominant capitalistic institutions should continue to be part of the strategy toward the goal of an ultimate direct democracy, Marcuse insisted that repressive patterns would be repeated unless consciousness came to embody this new aesthetic ethos. Throughout the 1970s Marcuse developed his position that participatory democracy, feminism and environmentalism were key components for shaping the new working majority.

To keep open this prospect, Marcuse completed shortly before his death his Marxist aesthetics: art and its object, beauty, invariably transcended any finite political practice and anchored such practice in an ongoing critique of pragmatic institutions: “At the optimum, we can envisage a universe common to art and reality, but in this common universe, art would retain its transcendence.” For only the aesthetic imagination was capable of coping with those universal conflicts – chance, fate, tragedy, love – that surpassed every revolution. Throughout these matured formulations of his postindustrial political philosophy, Marcuse both learned from and contributed to the variety of experiments ongoing in California in shaping a new “counter” culture.

If Marcuse closed with recognition of the new stage of political struggle as

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75 For detailed references to other lesser known writings of this period, cf. “Marcuse: Aesthetic Ethos,” in Chytry [1989], 434-435.

76 Cf. Marcuse [1961] for his use of Schiller. Marcuse’s “aesthetic ethos” is very probably a translation of Hegel’s “schöne Sittlichkeit” (Marcuse was the house Hegelian in the Frankfurt group). Marcuse’s use of “aesthetic morality” is probably a reminder of Nietzsche’s “ästhetische Moral.”

77 Marcuse [1972], 55, 42; also 134.


80 Marcuse [1978], 72.
one of decentralization and localization of efforts, it was Michel Foucault who
more directly took up the project of the emancipatory individual in a postmodern
context. Foucault’s dazzling interpretations of a history of reason and unreason,
including “madness,” as well as his agentless theories of historical epistememes
had already established a quixotic reputation for its author prior to the May 1968
uprisings in Paris. A late joiner to these upheavals, Foucault then became a key
figure in their institutionalization through the reform of the French university
system, and to a lesser extent, its prison system. Internationally recognized by the
early 1970s as the most prominent voice of the new radicalism, Foucault often
lectured throughout the globe.

One such stop, California, in May 1975 occasioned Foucault’s first
lingering taste of its “limit-experiences” and helped changed the trajectory of his
work. Foucault’s LSD experience in Death Valley, California (including the
obligatory visit to a nearby Taoist commune), recounted by companion Simeon
Wade, began a major stylistic change around 1975-76, as Foucault later saw it, for
his next major project after Discipline and Punish (1975).81 Although the first
volume of this project to be called the History of Sexuality – the French original
of the first volume is entitled La Volonté de Savoir (1976) – continues the
characteristic Foucauldian moves of demasking and exposure of forces of
domination, it proved the last of the genre. Foucault, who like Marcuse had been
avidly searching for an alternative to the classic proletariat as the revolutionary
class, gave up on his early 1970s expectations of the gauche prolétarienne and the
“plebes” in favor of the new gay culture emerging between 1975 and 1980 in the
Castro Street neighborhood of San Francisco, California. From this stage on,
Foucault was found experimenting with its new forms of pleasure, along with the
S/M fixations of nearby Folsom Street. Even if such subgroups could be found in
Paris and Mediterranean cities familiar to Foucault, he regarded the California
version as a far more promising candidate for the vanguard of new regimes of
bodies and pleasure that could also serve the wider heterosexual community.82

Around 1977-78 Foucault was finding it increasingly difficult to pursue
his Collège de France lectures in the conventional Foucauldian mould. The
problematic of a “biopolitics,” as he had previously framed it, was over. Specific
political events – from the revelations of the Gulag archipelago to the plight of
Vietnamese refugees and the struggle of Czech dissidents to the revolutionary
fervor in Iran – encouraged Foucault to contemplate more positive readings in the
direction of a “transcendens pure and simple.”83 Foucault’s Howisohn lecture at
the University of California, Berkeley, in October 1980 marks the watershed
toward a new reading of his history of sexuality project in which “techniques of
the self” increasingly replace the former fixation on domination and repression. It

81 Cf. Simeon Wade, “Foucault in California,” a manuscript of 121 pages, summarized in Miller
[1993], 246-253, 437-438. Unfortunately I have been unable to secure a copy of this manuscript.


83 Miller [1993], 299, 305.
is perhaps not surprising that this turn was accompanied by Foucault’s willingness
to become more “Californian” -- even apparently to preferring club sandwiches to
haute cuisine -- and tighten his links both with the gay scene in San Francisco and
with Californian academic life. Foucault seems to have been in the midst of
negotiations to make permanent his academic presence either at Berkeley or
Stanford at the time of his unexpected death due to AIDS in June 1984. 84

Publication of the second and third volumes of Foucault’s History of
Sexuality shortly after his death – a fourth, almost complete volume was never
published – reveals a dramatically different Foucault, one which disappointed a
great many of his admirers who expected more of the standard Foucault. Even to
the point of style, these works – The Use of Pleasure and Care of the Self – are
reserved, classical in tone, and committed to what Foucault increasingly called
“an aesthetics of existence.” In effect, the entire History of Sexuality project was
transformed into a “history of the techniques of the self” in which Foucault
concentrated on modes of “subjectivization” (mode d’assujettissement) leading to a
reinstatement of the Hellenic aesthetics of existence and stylistics of the self, but
on the new levels achieved through a subsequent dialectic of bodies and
pleasures. 85 Even though Foucault, on one occasion at least, insisted that his new
object was not the “Californian cult of the self,” 86 it is clear that California was the
appropriate site for further experimentations along this trajectory – certainly
for Foucault.

Foucault’s new account established three major stages in the process of
the creation of a new aesthetics of existence. The first one, the classic-Hellenic,
centered on the “aphrodisia,” an ethical substance capable of interrelating acts,
desires, and pleasures, even if these were on behalf primarily of a ruling male
hierarchy. 87 Increasingly, however, “care of the self” began to reflect increasing
concerns in the Hellenistic-Roman period of bodily and ethical excess that needed
to be domesticated and disciplined. 88 Such “care of the self” was still a
subcategory of the “aphrodisia,” but it was beginning to problematize concerns
about protecting the self that could be seen as transitions to a very different
perspective. This perspective, Foucault believed, was one obsessed with the
“flesh” as the site for temptations that needed to be simultaneously confessed and

84 Cf. “Zen and California,” in Eribon [1991], 309-316. Eribon’s prose tries to capture a Foucault
“happy in the pleasures of the flesh,” as around 1983 he looked ahead to “moving to the United
States. He dreamed aloud of living in the Californian paradise. Sunny, magnificent ...” (316).

85 Foucault [1985], 27.

86 Cf. Foucault’s disclaimer in a 1983 interview. Foucault [2003], 118. Foucault held that this
“Californian cult of the self” was premised on the effort “to discover one’s true self” and to this
extent differed sharply from the “ancient cult of the self.” Note also his interviewer’s emphasis on
the “Berkeley” (California) attempt to “perfect all aspects of everyday life” (109).

87 Foucault [1985], 38ff.

88 Foucault [1986].
repressed. Having reached this epochal turn toward the Christian suspicion of the body and its “libido,” Foucault appears to have been aiming at completing the circle to his earlier works on “sex” as a mode of disciplinary discourse emerging in the nineteenth-century society of disciplinary “knowledge.” Notwithstanding Foucault’s premature death, his account of a basic history of the body from (1) the classical aphrodisia (an aesthetics of existence turning into care of the self), through (2) the late antiquity-early Christian confessions of the flesh, to (3) the modern discursivity of sex and sexuality remains clear.

Thus, by 1978 California had taught Foucault to see the emancipatory aspects implicit in this account as a possible “extraordinary falsification of pleasure” in which the body would become “a place for the production of extraordinarily polymorphic pleasures, while simultaneously detaching it from a valorization of the genitalia and particularly of the male genitalia,” in short, a “general economy of pleasure not based on sexual norms.” Freed from the characteristic orgasmic goals of the penis or vagina, such “limit-experiences” opened up an anarchy within the body that promised a “nondisciplinary eroticism.” Through such experiments in which a non-disciplinary theatricality of S/M was to be primary, Foucault foresaw a domain of pulsation and oscillation that could resemble the intensities of traditional mystical and meditative experience, or for that matter the intensities offered by psychedelic experience. The gay life (vie gay) could play the vanguard role in such explorations, since it offered the possibility of a creative life (vie creatrice) that hovered beyond the disciplinary limitations of “sex” and sexual discursivities. If Marcuse had found California inspiring for suggesting the goal of an “aesthetic ethos of socialism,” Foucault came to draw from California this closing image of a technique of the self giving rise to his new “aesthetics of existence.”

For Jacques Derrida meanwhile, the value of California remains to be fully clarified. French postmodern writers often associated with Derrida had already singled out the importance of California prior to Derrida’s intervention. In 1975 Jean François Lyotard claimed that the postmodern had been localized in California. In 1986 Jean Baudrillard regarded California as the quintessence of

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90 The best brief account by Foucault is Foucault [1985], 11-13.
91 Foucault, cited in Miller [1993], 269.
93 Besides the introduction of the “aesthetics of existence” theme in his second volume of The History of Sexuality (The Use of Pleasure), the most important text for the contemporary relevance of this concept is Foucault’s 1983 interview in Foucault [2003], 102-125.
western civilization where history, the modern and humanity approached its end. For good reason it has been argued that since the 1960s California has come to be seen as the “site in which the conflicts of the modern and postmodern” are to be played out. The heterogeneous body of critical thinking that came to be known simply as “theory” (generally following Jonathan Culler’s designations) even encouraged the suggestion that “California” had come to represent the “flipped-out side” of “Germany,” or to put it bluntly: “the scene [Schauplatz] of Theory ... is California.”

Given the fact of his recent death in 2004, Derrida’s enormous output is only now the subject of an effective overview. Yet Derrida’s career cannot be adequately assessed without taking into account his turn to this California midway in that career. In the 1970s -- after his notable participation in a conference at Johns Hopkins University in 1966 --Derrida was brought to the United States through allies and sympathizers in such academic centers as Yale University, and through J. Hillis Miller made a connection with the Irvine campus of the University of California by the early 1980s. His Irvine Wellek lectures in 1984 on his friend, the recently deceased and lately controversial literary theorist Paul de Man, belongs to a new phase in the response of deconstruction -- augmented by Derrida’s slightly later work on Heidegger -- to charges of its ethical and political emptiness.

Derrida scholars like Anthony Caputo regard the subsequent period of Derrida’s writings as affecting “a whole new life in the academy,” one which might be termed the “ethico-political turn” in deconstruction. Of course, Derrida would strenuously deny that deconstruction had ever been “empty” in this sense – let alone implicitly anti-progressive – but there is no doubt that the writings of the 1990s reflect a new seriousness in grappling with conventional issues of ethics and politics. This seriousness went hand-in-hand with Derrida’s assumption of a professorship of philosophy, French and comparative literature at Irvine in 1986 (at the same time as his colleague J. Hillis Miller), a position he held to his death, and the creation between 1990 and 1995 of the Derrida Archives on the Irvine campus. Without questioning that Derrida remained throughout a distinctly French and indeed Parisian thinker, it is worth asking how these new commitments to California – even to entrusting his precious manuscripts to its archival catacombs – are reflected in Derrida’s writings of the 1990s, particularly

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95 Baudrillard [1986], 245: “la puissance mythique de la Californie est dans ce mixte d’une extrême déconnexion et d’une mobilité vertigineuse prise dans le site, le scénario hyperréal des déserts, des freeways, de l’océan et du soleil.”

96 Rickels [1991], 7. “If postmodernity is postmarked ... ‘made in Germany’ ... then California is its address and tech-nofuture” (11). I follow in general the helpful introduction by Kniesche in Kniesche [1995], 11-17.

97 Kniesche [1995], 12.

98 Thus we now have a first complete biography by Powell [2006]. Cf. also Bennington & Derrida [1993].

Once professionally connected with California, Derrida began to offer appreciative comments on his new base. Thus, shortly after his Irvine appointment, Derrida participated in an imposing colloquium of “theory” scholars at Irvine in 1987 where, claiming to have misunderstood the theme of the colloquium to be “the state of theory” (rather than: “the states of ‘theory’”), Derrida reflected:

And I thought that the answer to this question -- What is the state of theory today? -- was then self-evident, it was obvious, hic et nunc. The state of theory, *now and from now on*, isn’t it *California*? And even Southern California?99

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99 Derrida [1990], 63 (emphasis added). Formally the colloquium was intended to initiate the Critical Theory Institute at Irvine.
Immediately forestalling the temptation to take his words “as a play on words or as a way of avoiding the issue,” Derrida added that “this answer may be more serious, more realistic, more historical, and ‘historian’ than it seems.” Why indeed, he wondered pointedly, was this colloquium “happening in California?”

According to one interpreter, this pregnant passage suggests that Derrida was pinpointing California as the very “institutionalization of deconstruction in America” and that he was underscoring “the ambivalent potential of this state or state of mind.” Looking upon the “state of ‘theory’,” Derrida was buoyed up by the “taxonomic disorder” of “theory” in its double sense as “political organization” and “as report, assessment, account = statement.” Deliberately classifying “California” under the former – that is, under “political organization” or “institutional fortifications” – Derrida saw “increasingly flexible, mobile” conditions for this “state” as he added:

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100 Derrida [1990], 63 (emphasis added).

“the state of California is once more exemplary in that respect, we are used to theoretical earthquakes here, and institutional architectures are erected to respond to the seisms or seismisms of all the new isms which might shake the structures, both post and new structures.”\textsuperscript{102}

\textsuperscript{102} Derrida [1990], 87-88 (emphasis added). Note Derrida’s use of the collective “we” in this passage.
“California” also meant for Derrida the infusion of “theory” into such burgeoning academic movements as the New Marxism and the New Historicism, the latter which Derrida associated with “Northern California” after “transplants” from “French vineyards.” These two apparent challenges to the putative a-historicism of deconstruction were welcomed by Derrida – indeed he claimed that he “would be very happy to contribute to this development” – insofar as they in effect matured from being mere reactions to “a deconstructionist poststructuralism” which was little more than a “caricatural myth,” and embraced the degree to which deconstruction was itself not a “theory,” nor a “manifesto,” but a summation of this entire outflow of ideas and original thinking called “theory.” Put provocatively: “deconstruction is the case,” it was not a theory “but the opening of a space,” encouraging that “something happen, that’s what’s better, that’s all.” Preceding all ethics, politics, aesthetics, historical and social reality, “it is what happens, what is happening today.”

Derrida felt justified in absorbing all these more apparently historically-oriented approaches into the ecumenism of deconstruction by reminding his audience that ultimately the double game of deconstruction “starts by tackling logocentrism,” thus already containing the kind of concern for the “political-juridical-sociohistorical” that the New Marxists and New Historians were presumably pushing. Hence Derrida’s punchline: deconstruction “isn’t essentially theoretical, thetic, or thematic because it is also ethical-political.” With this injection of the pivotal phrase “ethical-political,” Derrida henceforth wedded the direction of his later works to the goal of a “happening” that had been building up “for twenty years” (meaning presumably 1966-1986) in no less a “state” than the “state of California” where New Historians were prospering in Northern California (presumably at locations like the University of California, Santa Cruz) and the non-“theory” of deconstruction was securing supporters in locations as varied as the Santa Barbara and Berkeley campuses of the University of California. Doing his best semiotically to discourage deconstruction from itself freezing into an institutionalized theorizing, Derrida pressed the language of “happening” – clearly derived from the Heideggerian concept of history-as-happening (die Geschichte geschieht) – for his vision of what might well unfold for both “California” and “deconstruction” as the paradigmatic “state of theory,” his pointed answer to the original question of why such a colloquium was “happening in California.”

Derrida’s substantial efforts to articulate the “ethical-political” dimension of deconstruction permeates his major works of the 1990s across a wide spectrum of topics from justice, religion, and mourning to politics and friendship. With California as its “state of theory” for “the opening of a space” in which something “happened,” deconstruction became increasingly “messianic” in the straightforward sense of exploiting the double movement of expecting a “coming” that remained simultaneously eternally deferred. Precisely this interstitiality saved such ultimate standards from hardening into the kind of conceptuality that deconstruction eschewed as remnants of logocentric western thinking.

Thus in the 1989-1990 lectures later published as “Force of Law” (1994), Derrida

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103 Derrida emphasizes: “I very sincerely wish that they develop even more.” Derrida [1990], 90.

104 Derrida [1990], 80, 82, 85.

105 This language also means “reality, history, society, law, politics” according to Derrida. Derrida [1990], 91 (emphasis in original), 87 (emphasis added).
approached the “idea of justice” as an always coming, a to-come (*a-venir*, French for “future”): “The future loses the openness, the coming of the other (who comes), without which there is no justice;” indeed, “perhaps justice is another kind of mysticism.” As for “God,” it is “the Wholly Other, as always,” “the name of the absolute metonymy.”

Similar moves marked the later Derrida’s most narratively coherent text on the ethical-political proper. In *Politics of Friendship* (1997) Derrida presented a compelling image of a (future) Democracy in which the very concept of friendship, and such interrelated terms of fraternity, comradeship, hospitality, and even perhaps love, were deconstructed from their bounded historical implications – along with the latter’s complicitous relationship to dialectic movements of friendship and hostility – to emerge reconstructed without the confining baggage of past interpretations:

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106 “Force of Law” originally consisted of two separate talks, the second one given at the University of California, Los Angeles. Derrida [2002], 256, 254, 293.
“For democracy remains to come; this is its essence in so far as it remains: not only will it remain indefinitely perfectible, hence always insufficient and future, but, belonging to the time of the promise, it will always remain, in each of its future times, to come: even where there is a democracy, it never exists, it is never present, it remains the theme of a non-presentable concept.”

"California is very important ... because nowhere else has the upheaval most shamelessly caused by capitalist centralization taken place with such speed."

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107 Derrida [1997], 306. Notwithstanding the connections between Derrida’s image of the “state of California” and such ideas, his biographer notes that in his final years Derrida became less interested in America and more reoriented toward Europe. Powell [2006].
Where, finally, do we stand today in terms of the interchange between Californian civilization and European speculative thought? Although there is no reason to doubt that productive dialogue will continue indefinitely, it is highly probable that the great age of interchange is over for the following reasons.

In the first place, the three stages clearly record the story of a young civilization gradually but unmistakably catching up with an older and more patrimonial civilization. Thus the first stage is highlighted by a native Californian, Josiah Royce, seeking out superior European wisdom, both cultural and speculative, in German university centers that reflected the rise to prominence of modern German culture and power in the heart of Europe. The second stage meanwhile is the story of a major intellectual diaspora, the Central European emigration from an increasingly totalitarian Europe to more clement Californian shores, where Californian asylum helped encourage at least three major works in European speculation: Bertold Brecht’s second version of *Galileo*, Thomas Mann’s *Doktor Faustus*, and Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno’s *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. By the third stage the European contributors are coming to California not only for the fiscal largesse of its thriving universities but also for the stimulation of new social and cultural patterns to be embedded in the variety of notions – an aesthetic ethos of socialism, an aesthetics of existence, a politics of friendship and (impossible) Democracy -- developed by three major thinkers in the postwar European radical tradition of thought: Herbert Marcuse, Michel Foucault, and Jacques Derrida. Thus, by the third stage, it could be fairly claimed that Europeans were also learning from California, and this meant that as of the twenty-first century California and Californians had in effect more than caught up, in their own self-images and self-confidence, with the phenomenon known as “Europe.” From now on “Europe” need no longer function as the necessary great Fount.

In the second place, the great European speculative tradition itself is probably over. This is due to a variety of factors, not least to the growth and expansion of a globalizing European “union” that has increasingly had the same dampening effects on speculation that the American continental republic had on earlier centers of American speculation – something Royce himself lamented as an undermining of “provincial” cultures by the hegemonical center. While it is evident that Europe continues to produce its throngs of first-rate scholars and critics, no great name in speculation has appeared to follow the stature of the last wave associated primarily with the names of Jürgen Habermas, Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida.

And thirdly, the Californian demographic future of cultural diversity with its growing plurality of Latinos (meaning Western Hemispheric Hispanic speakers) and increasing preeminence of Asian-Americans (primarily Chinese Mandarin-speaking in origin, but also Japanese and Korean) at academic and research centers leaves increasingly less room for


109 In his call for a “Higher Provincialism,” Royce critiques these tendencies of centralization that undermine variety. “Provincialism,” in Royce [1908], 74-76. This essay is closely tied to Royce’s own “provincialism to which I, as a native Californian, personally owe most” (vi).

110 Nor is it probable, granted that Europeans themselves have deprived their thinkers of the right to think “boldly” – recalling the severe carceral grilling accorded the more extreme pronouncements of the previous generations of such transgressive thinkers as Nietzsche and Heidegger -- or even for that matter Karl Marx.
anything like a common interest in a source known as “Europe” -- let alone the latter’s speculative tradition.

Still, as this paper recounts, the fact of significant interchange has indeed taken place. Whatever the character of speculative thought in California’s future, Californians can ill afford to ignore the fruits of the three stages we have traced and delineated -- from Royce’s vision of a Goethean-Hellenic civilization all the way to Derrida’s convoluted defense of a Democracy never-to-be. To this extent European speculation must be henceforth reckoned a vibrant element in the unfolding story of a California civilization.
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