Ladies and Gentlemen,

I hope that you did not expect an expert lecture from me. I will limit myself in the introduction to this significant and important conference, which I am very glad is taking place in Prague, to three or four personal comments. I first came into contact with the work of Professor Patočka in the deep, dark 1950s when I was a boy of around 15 years old, who almost like a detective found out that there exists a book called “The Natural World as a Philosophical Problem”. The book was in the university library, but it was not lent out because of the fact that it was banned. And the system at the time was that banned books could be borrowed in individual cases if a certain Mr. Jirkovský agreed to it. I gathered up the courage to go to him and convince him to agree, which he fortunately did. I read “The Natural World as a Philosophical Problem” and, together with about one or two other books, it massively influenced my life. I realized from that book that I am embraced by the natural world, which has its closeness, its farness, its up and its down, which has a kind of horizon, which has its mystery, and that this world is something a little different than what science offers us. A small example: it is this natural world in which the cosmos appears as something incomprehensibly big. It does not necessarily appear to astronomers this way. They measure it in their parsecs and something is simply closer or farther, but it is not appropriate for astronomers to marvel at some kind of mystery. It is appropriate for them to research further and accumulate more and more knowledge.

My second comment concerns the 1960s. At that time I already knew Professor Patočka personally and I invited him to the theater I was working at. He held lectures, debates, and discussions for us after the performances during the night. He was an enthralling debater, he was an oral type of philosopher, a Socratic type of philosopher and the gripping nature of these debates was demonstrated by the fact that even the actors remained until the end.

The third comment is connected to the 1970s. I was the one who was delegated to invite Professor Patočka to become a spokesperson of Charter 77. I was a witness to his decision-making. He hesitated a long time because he knew that it concerned something that could be immensely risky, that it had to do with something that could completely change his life, the way of life and it could end up with him going to prison. Moreover, he had the feeling that in Czechoslovakia there were personalities of his generation to whom it should be offered instead of him, because they had manifested their civic engagement more clearly for their whole lives and were important social figures. And only when I got some sort of explicit support from them did Professor Patočka decide in the end that he would accept the position. But when he decided thus, he then took it upon himself with a mortal seriousness. He dedicated every free minute of his life to Charter 77. He even personally distributed various samizdat pamphlets around Prague. He wrote several short essays that are famous and very
important for the history of Charter 77. He truly personally vouched for everything that he did and paradoxically that was sort of validated by the circumstances of his death.

In my last comment I would like to touch upon the legacy of Professor Patočka. He was the one who considerably contributed to the constitution of the moral dimension of Charter 77 and was the main person who articulated it. It was he who talked about the solidarity of the shaken. He said that there are things that it is necessary to do because they are good in themselves, even though it is not possible to calculate whether and when they will be evaluated and transformed into some kind of success; it is necessary even to sacrifice something for them since they concern values that we consider as fundamental, as important, as those which are worth sacrifice. I travel around the world often and meet with dissidents, opposition people and human rights defenders in a great variety of countries and mainly in those countries where there are dictatorships or authoritarian regimes, regardless of whether they fly the banner calling themselves right wing or left. It is interesting how all of them, in sometimes even surprising ways, endorse the legacy of Charter 77, especially its moral dimension. The idea of non-violent resistance, which is vouched for with one’s whole being, somehow spread and Professor Patočka to a significant degree also gets the credit for this. I think that the fact that we had a happy ending in our country obliges us to be in solidarity precisely with all those who have so far not had a happy ending and who might never experience one during their lifetimes. It seems to me that this is a relevant call or challenge for today.

In conclusion I would like to apologize for speaking Czech. If there were only foreigners here then I would speak English. But there are many Czechs and to face those Czechs who know English better than I do, I am immensely ashamed to speak English. I wish this important conference success.
**Jan Patočka Session**

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*Negative Platonism: Between the History of Philosophy and the Philosophy of History*

The idea of “negative Platonism” as a way of understanding and overcoming metaphysics is central to Patočka’s most ambitious project. This project was never realized as a whole, but the fragments throw light on his later work. In particular, the text known as “Negative Platonism” can be read as a complement to the evolving phenomenology of the world, adumbrated in early writings and radicalized in later ones. The same text also contains a brief but highly suggestive hint at ways of comparing the Greek beginnings of philosophy with developments in other civilizations during the “Axial Age”, as well as reflections on themes that reappear in other contexts in Patočka’s *Heretical Essays*. The paper will explore some of these interconnections.

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*Phénoménologie et hénologie chez J. Patočka*

Dans *Des hégémonies brisées*, Rainer Schürmann distingue, en s’appuyant sur des textes néo-platoniciens, deux versions de la différence ontologique. L’une est remontée à un fondement de l’étant : elle est différence métaphysique. L’autre fait apparaître l’Un comme condition même de l’étant : elle est différence hénologique, mais elle peut être dite aussi phénoménologique car l’Un est la condition transcendantale de l’apparaître. Notre propos est de montrer que telle est exactement la position de Patočka et que sa phénoménologie est par conséquent une hénologie. Nous procéderons en trois étapes : 1) la question de l’être doit être abordée à partir de celle de l’apparaître : l’ontologie n’a de sens que comme phénoménologie ; 2) l’apparaître ne saurait être compris s’il est référé à un apparaissant, quel qu’il soit : la différence phénoménologique ne peut être une différence métaphysique ; 3) il n’y a de dépassement de l’étant (de l’apparition) vers son apparaître que comme mise au jour de sa soumission à une condition d’unité : la différence phénoménologique n’a de sens que comme différence hénologique.
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**Jan Patočka and Central European Polis Thought**

This paper is concerned with an important facet of Jan Patočka’s thought, namely, his affiliation with what I term “polis thought”, which I distinguish from “political theory”, and which was shared by a number of other Central European thinkers of his generation. Attending Martin Heidegger’s lectures in 1933 as a student of Heidegger’s own teacher Edmund Husserl, Patočka, in his final years, brought polis thought directly into the arena of political activity through his influence on the Czech dissident movement that culminated in his student Václav Havel’s Velvet Revolution of 1989. I compare Patočka’s thought in this regard with a number of other thinkers indebted to Heidegger’s approach toward the polis, including Hannah Arendt, Karl Löwith, and Herbert Marcuse, and I try to show Patočka’s originality in this respect. Finally, I raise the question of whether this shared interest and exploitation of the theme of the polis have intrinsic connections with the Central European cultural backgrounds of these protagonists.

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**Phénoménologie transcendantale – phénoménologie asubjective : Quelques apories.**

1) L’exigence d’une phénoménologie asubjective :  
Après avoir rappelé brièvement les arguments essentiels contre le subjectivisme de la phénoménologie husserlienne (dès les Recherches Logiques et jusqu’à la Krisis), on s’interrogera sur la reprise et la radicalisation, étayée sur différentes capitales à Heidegger de l’époché, versus réduction/constitution, et sur les différentes tentatives de Patočka pour esquisser les grandes lignes de ce qu’il nomme encore, selon une paléonymie sans doute problématique, le monde, c’est-à-dire l’articulation, le cadre, la sphère ou la structure de la phénoménalité : l’en tant que (l’apparition) et dans le retrait.  

2) La possibilité/impossibilité d’une phénoménologie asubjective :  
Nous examinerons ensuite quelques unes des tentatives esquissées par Patočka dans les années 70 pour sortir des apories constubstancielles au projet même d’une phénoménologie asubjective : le sum, existo, d’une instance non égologique, alors même qu’elle implique la « mienneté » : apparaître, c’est « apparaître-à-moi » ; l’articulation entre le phénomène du monde et les mouvements fondamentaux de l’existence humaine.  

3) Nous examinerons enfin si et dans quelle mesure la dimension spéculaire de l’auto-apparaître du monde au miroir de l’existence réintroduit ou non, à la faveur du retournement asubjectif de la phénoménologie husserlienne les traits spéculatifs de l’idéalisme et/ou ceux de l’historicisme heideggérien, à la mesure cette fois de l’histoire de l’être.
La peur, le courage, la colère : la leçon de Socrate

Il s’agira dans cette présentation d’éclairer l’engagement politique de Patočka aux côtés des dissidents et comme porte-parole de la charte 77, à partir de sa méditation du souci de l’âme - c’est-à-dire d’en interroger les fondements éthiques et ontologiques. Ce faisant, c’est la figure de Socrate que l’on rencontrera ; Socrate, dont, dans les années 70, à l’instar de Hegel, Kierkegaard ou Nietzsche, Patočka dresse un portrait saisissant. En filigrane, c’est la question des affects au fondement de la communauté politique (le courage et la colère, par opposition à la peur) qui sera posée. Elle n’a rien perdu de son actualité.

In this lecture, we will attempt to shed light on Patočka’s political commitment both alongside other dissidents and as the spokesman of the Charter 77, starting with his meditation on the care of the soul; in other words, we will interrogate its ethical and ontological foundations. In doing so, we will encounter the figure of Socrates—the Socrates of whom Patočka constructed a portrait in the 1970s, following the example of Hegel, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche. The question that will implicitly accompany us will be about the affects at the basis of the political community (courage and anger, as opposed to fear). This question has in no way lost its actuality.

“Idealities of Nature”: Patočka on Reflection and the Three Movements of Life

Like Levinas, Marion, Merleau-Ponty, and Fink – among many others – Jan Patočka was concerned to develop phenomenology beyond the restrictions imposed on it by its founder, Edmund Husserl, and only incompletely addressed by Husserl’s successor, Martin Heidegger. But unlike the other thinkers mentioned, Patočka sees himself as remaining in the tradition of transcendental phenomenology, identifying his own position as “a formal transcendentalism of appearing as such.” In this paper I explore some of the tensions that emerge in Patočka’s attempt to bring “cosmological” notions – of the “whole,” the “infinite,” “nature,” and so on – within the orbit of phenomenology while still adhering to the critical principle of “demonstration” characteristic of transcendental phenomenology. Specifically, I examine Patočka’s attempt to criticize Husserl’s concept of “reflection” – the locus of Husserl’s transcendental method – without abandoning its critical potential. This leads to an examination of his phenomenology of “appearing as such,” and to the question of how the laws or structures of such appearing are to be grasped in a methodological way. Given that such laws and structures are not causal operations but structures of meaning, a tension emerges between the goal of an “asubjective” phenomenology and the very idea of normatively structured laws of meaning. This, finally, provides a context for assessing the extent to which Patočka’s late theory of the three “movements of life” can provide a philosophically compelling transcendental account of our access to the “interval” of meaning that Patočka calls the “world.”
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The 20th Century as War

At the core of Jan Patočka’s formulation of his concept of the “solidarity of the shaken” in the Heretical Essays is a reflection, inspired by Ernst Jünger and Martin Heidegger (among others), on what has become a central metaphor of war in the 20th century: the front line experience. Patočka’s reflections are characteristic of a relatively small but significant trend within philosophy – and phenomenological or existential philosophy in particular – to interpret the trauma, shock, and extremity of the front line experience as paradigmatic of the spiritual reality of the 20th century, as if war itself had become the fundamental phenomenon that had brought to light the metaphysical essence of the age. This paper argues that this insistence on the centrality of war as “the line” is a key, if often undeveloped aspect of the phenomenological tradition, and that it has played an important role in the orientation of phenomenology as a reflection on the spiritual condition of the age. To understand what is at stake in these “reflections on violence,” and come to terms with the questions and problems they have raised for us, is essential to any assessment of the legacy of phenomenological philosophy in general, and perhaps of Jan Patočka in particular.

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The Relevance of Patočka’s “Negative Platonism”

In 20th century continental philosophy, several evaluative standpoints with regard to the metaphysical tradition can be discerned, each working with a different concept of metaphysics:

1. Successive attempts to overcome metaphysics, taken as a philosophical position with a fixed foundation (Nietzsche, Heidegger, Levinas, Derrida);
2. The idea that metaphysics, i.e., the effort to reach absolute knowledge, has been left behind for a long time already (Gadamer, Habermas);
3. Metaphysics as a set of recurrent unanswerable basic questions (Merleau-Ponty, Patočka).

This is the background against which the relevance of Patočka’s “Negative Platonism” will be sketched, highlighting its main distinguishing aspects, especially in a comparison with the work of Derrida, which is very close to the thought of Patočka, but has some important differences as well.
Les trois communautés du mouvement de la vie humaine chez Jan Patocka

A partir des textes des années 1970, il s’agira de dégager les rapports de la communauté et de la vie. La communauté est certes ce qui rend le rapport non-indifférent au monde à moins que ce ne soit en raison de notre être-avec les autres, de notre être parmi les autres que nous ne puissions pas avoir de rapport neutre au monde. Autrement dit, le monde est essentiellement et avant tout monde humain, mais, dès lors que notre être est non-indifférent et que le corps propre est d’emblée médiatisé par autrui, la communauté peut être comprise comme a-subjective. Plusieurs types de communautés se dégagent : celle qui est accaparée par la vie nue, la communauté de la maisonnée et de la sphère du travail. Mais du point de vue de l’ébranlement, elle apparaît comme la fausse communauté politique, comme la collectivité des travailleurs, une société primitive. En effet, la communauté politique au sens strict, celle qui permet la recherche de la vérité, c’est-à-dire de la vie dans la liberté. Dans ce cas, il faut distinguer la communauté comme polis grecque et la polis grecque revue par Socrate-Platon, ainsi que celle qui est reçue par leurs héritiers, les philosophes. C’est alors que Socrate et Platon se distinguent nettement dans leur rapport à la communauté.

Beyond Myth and Enlightenment - Religion in the work of Patočka

Patočka’s writings on the European history of ideas can be said to center around the spiritual dimension of modernity or, as he puts it, around the question of how the Christian humanity turned into a “post-Christian”. Patočka argues that modern history from the late middle ages until the rise of nihilism in the 19th century can be seen as the unfolding of two kinds of radicalism: a religious escapism, on the one hand, overdrawing the Christian doctrine of salvation and an enforced implementation of the objectified and rationalized techno-scientific reductionism, on the other hand. What is lost with these exclusive radicalizations, is — according to Patočka — the tension arising from divergent and conflicting worldviews. The attempt to finally overcome and “solve” these tensions discloses “auto-immunizing” tendencies, as they are characteristic for the mutual exclusion of faith and knowledge in modern times, suppressing a view on religion beyond the dichotomy of myth and enlightenment.
Patočka’s Phenomenological Appropriation of Plato

The paper investigates a strand of Patočka’s phenomenological appropriation of Plato in Plato and Europe, what is there termed the “ontocosmic” dimension proper to care of the soul, and argues that this appropriation is fundamentally influenced by Plato’s “so-called unwritten doctrine.” This doctrine, and not the influence or anticipation of Heidegger’s notion of Sorge, is shown as the basis for Patočka’s claim that “what shows the activity of the soul in the proper sense is our relation to the mathematical world.”

The investigation of Patočka’s account of care of the soul also explores the influence of Jacob Klein’s reconstruction of the “ideas-numbers” in the Platonic doctrine on Patočka’s presentation of the chorismos thesis, which is inseparable from this doctrine. It is argued that this thesis is a major factor in Patočka’s notion of the fundamental distinction between (1) what manifests itself and (2) manifesting, and that this distinction informs his critique of Husserl’s and Heidegger’s phenomenological subjectivism, together with his own concept of the phenomenon proper to phenomenology.

The paper concludes by pointing out certain problems in Patočka’s critique of the metaphysical character of the Platonic account of “appearing existence” that follow from his endorsement of Konrad Gaiser’s reconstruction of the “dimensional generation” of solids as a fundamental aspect of Platonism. These problems are located in Gaiser’s reversal of the Republic’s (Book VI) account of the image-paradigm distinction as it relates to mathematical hypotheses and eide, and the paper ends by suggesting that the restoration of the proper order to this relationship holds the key to substantiating Patočka’s original thought, that the structure of manifesting has to be “something more” than what manifests itself, if manifesting is to occur.

Epoché et traduction, une réflexion sur la philosophie de la traduction en partant de Patočka

Language is the reciprocal disclosure of man and world. But language does not exist outside a plurality of historical languages. In this hiatus between the unity of language and the plurality of languages, translation becomes a philosophical question. My hypothesis is that thinking about translation is fertile for a deeper understanding of the meaning of phenomenology, starting from Ricoeur and Patočka. We consider these three fundamental theses of phenomenology:

1. Meaning is the most comprehensive category of phenomenological description;
2. The subject is the bearer of meaning;
3. Reduction is the philosophical act that permits the birth of a being for meaning.

All three of these theses can be clarified when we test them against the diversity of languages and against translation. We can perhaps obtain a better understanding of what an asubjective phenomenology means.
If every language is like a world, to reduce or distance ourselves from a language, methodologically neutralizing it, is exactly what happens when one deals with a foreign language (and with every language of otherness). Then reduction loses its potential as a fantastic and impossible operation of exiting the world. It becomes possible and necessary to reach a transcendental humanity. That is the basis of people speaking a language in which they were born to consciousness, but we are also able to understand other human beings speaking different languages. This approach has a clear influence on the conception of the subject (always embodied in a world through the mediation of a language), and on the conception of meaning as the space opened by translation in order to compare and let our perspectives on the world be communicated.

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Aims and Outcomes: Patočka’s Philosophical Development

Patočka tried to find his own philosophical position several times during his life. (1) His 1936 book on “Natural World as a Philosophical Problem”, based on strictly Husserlian lines, did not express the whole of Patočka’s philosophical aims at that time, which included a philosophy of history based on Heideggerian lines. (2) During World War II, Patočka conceived a new systematic project in which he sought to work out his own version of transcendental philosophy combining both Husserl’s and Hedegger’s approaches, but looking also back towards the philosophical aims of German idealism. This project remained unfinished and, for a long time, also unknown. (3) After 1945 Patočka undertook a modest attempt to accommodate this conception to the contemporary debate on the concept of existence, (4) but in the early 1950’s, following his lectures on Plato and on Hegel, he launched a new and different project known under the name of “Negative Platonism”. This, however, did not remain his view either. (5) He abandoned it in favor of a new idea based on the concept of the ontological movement worked out in connection with his studies of Aristotle in the early 1960’s. On this basis, he attempted to work out a philosophy of human life that would be open to a broader ontological perspective. (6) Finally, his renewed interest in the study of Hussel since the mid-sixties led him to an attempt of a revision of Hussel’s conception of phenomenology as a science of phaenomena qua phaenomena. (Conclusion) Both last concepts, viz. an ontology of the movement of human existence and an asubjective phenomenology, remained a subject of Patočka’s meditation until the 1970’s. But the question is if they fit together and if, trying to mediate between them, Patočka really attained the philosophical position of his own he was looking for since his early years.
Patočka’s concept of Europe is a philosophical concept in a double sense of the term. First: it is not established through a geographical nor political determination of the term, but by way of a philosophical reflection on the “problems of a post-European humanity”. Second: this reflection takes its start from a critical discussion of the late Husserl’s tentative to laying again the foundation of the philosophical rationality of Europe—to realize the idea of philosophy as self-responsibility of humanity as a way to overcome the crisis of European civilization. For sure, Husserl’s phenomenological practice of philosophy – his intentional-historical approach to unveil the original sources of European sciences in the Crisis – represents a novel way in terms of philosophical method and doctrinal contents. However, for Patočka, Husserl’s idea of philosophy and philosophical rationality as universal scientific reason is an old one: it represents “one of the last links in the chain of typically European perspectives on foreign civilizations and their worlds. The European is placed above all other conceptions for the apparently ‘objective’ reasons, taking into account its ‘universal rationality’; the superior value of the European principle, its necessity face to the contingency of other ways borrowed through the evolution of humanity, are naïvely presupposed, without any supporting prove.” In fact, it is well-known that in the Crisis, Husserl treats other great civilizations like that of India or China as “merely anthropological type”. Only “the Europeanization of all other civilizations” will be able to avoid “a historical non-sense of the world”. Patočka was well aware that, such an attitude, which is full of Eurocentric overtones, “cannot provide the basis of understanding between different human worlds, cannot pave the way to a universal reconciliation, but only to the destruction of fundamental humanities by the generalized extenuation of the mystery of the world.”

Emphasizing humanities in the plural, Patočka proposes, in one of his late lecture series Plato and Europe, a backward questioning more radical than Husserl: not only going back to the idea of Greek philosophy as did Husserl, but further back to the situation in which Greek philosophy was born: its pre-reflective mythical environment or mood. If Patočka still understands the task of philosophy as self-responsibility of humanity, he understands it no more in the Husserlian way, i.e., as a universal rational science, but as care of the soul. By a heroic interpretative effort Patočka invites us to go back to the Greek mythological framework to sketch the outline of a philosophical anthropology, which understands human existence as being capable of truth and justice. Such an anthropological sketch has a double merit. Vertically it can serve as the basis of an ontology of the phenomenalization of the world. Horizontally it can provide elements for a dialogue with the conception of human existence of Mencius Confucianism, one of the most representative and influential schools of the Chinese tradition in terms of moral and political philosophy. For to Mencius, the defining elements of human being are nothing other than the faculties of benevolence, righteousness, propriety and wisdom. These four terms are arguably variants of concepts of justice and truth.
Der Tod des Homo Divinus

In my lecture I will attempt a critical reading of the way in which Jan Patočka’s *Heretical Essays* reflect on the concept of religious orgasm. Also critically I will distance myself from the analyses that Jacques Derrida’s *The Gift of Death* dedicates to Patočka’s interpretation of orgasm. It will be the aim of my considerations to highlight the godliness of the human being as a momentum that cannot be integrated by a responsibility that stands in the sign of finitude. The “godly human being” is the real human being. As such, the human being disturbs the political as well as the tendency of the political to totally enclose all being in the realm in which the logic of power reigns. The anarchic orientation, surely present in both Patočka’s and Derrida’s thought, has thus to be adjusted more precisely. Only by doing so can it be avoided that the anarchic impulse ends up in the halfhearted *raison* of the present Western Civil Societies where the expression “democracy” fashions the outer foreign affairs while the same term palliates the different sorts of processes of pauperisation in the social interior.


“More than All the Others”: Meditation on Responsibility

Václav Havel echoed both Dostoyevsky and Lévinas when he wrote at the end of entry No. 122 of his *Letters to Olga* that “responsibility founds an asymmetrical ethical situation,” namely the “thought that ‘someone must begin’.” This responsibility cannot be “preached, but only borne.” It is existentially strange to specialize in discoursing on responsibility but not to become responsible. Havel recalls how in his dramas the most impressive ethical discourses are pronounced, absurdly so, by cowards and opportunists. Responsibility begins with an ethical response of oneself. Yet there is something uncanny, if not Atlas-like and Pelagian, in the infinitizing claim that “I am responsible for the state of the world.” I will meditate on Jan Patočka’s finite responsibility, Derrida’s aporetic emphasis on the infinite dimension of responsibility, and Lévinasian-Dostoyevskyan ethical-existential variations on in/finite responsibility. Havel alludes to hyperbolic ethics in a parenthetical
remark on the birth of the Manifesto for Human Rights in Czechoslovakia, “Charta 77.” With our three-pronged examination, the question before us is this: Which responsibility appears at this birth, or to put it otherwise, what responsibility is born in care for the soul and polis?

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Patočka's Asubjective Phenomenology, Artificial Intelligence and the Mind-Body Problem

In our times the mind-body problem has assumed the form of trying to explain the qualitative aspect of experience. As David Chalmers expresses it, “It is widely agreed that experience arises from a physical basis, but we have no good explanation of why and how it so arises.” In fact, as John Locke long ago noted, there is “no conceivable connection” between them. We cannot conceive how from the structure and dynamics of a physical process the appearing of the world can arise. In my paper, I argue that this impasse points to the reform of metaphysics that Patočka’s asubjective phenomenology envisaged. According to Patočka, the appearing of the world is “something completely original.” It “cannot be converted into anything that manifests itself in manifesting.” Various things appear, but “showing itself is not any of these things that show themselves.” If we accept this, then we cannot ontologize showing, i.e., explain it in terms of what shows itself. In particular, we cannot say that it is the result of the material elements and processes that make up a natural scientific account of perception. The unbridgeable gap between physical processes and experience points, in fact, to the originality of appearing or manifestation and, hence, to the study of it as envisaged in Patočka’s asubjective phenomenology.

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Jan Patočka’s Place in Classical Phenomenology

Jan Patočka has a peculiar place in 20th century European philosophy. On the one hand, his role is markedly characteristic in his homeland, and generally in Soviet-ruled Eastern-Europe during the second half of the 20th century. On the other hand, Patočka’s work is an integral part of 20th century phenomenology, that is to say Classical Phenomenology, as I want to call it. His work is embedded in the philosophical developments of the Eastern part of Europe, paralleled by such authors as Roman Ingarden or Karol Wojtyła. At the same time he was a critical follower of the main figures of Classical Phenomenology, especially of Husserl and Heidegger, to a lesser extent of the French phenomenologists like J-P. Sartre. In my talk I will concentrate on Patočka’s specific place in the history of Classical Phenomenology. This history, just like for instance the history of positivism, is a philosophical story of important achievements that are part and parcel of an organic development of a particular set of philosophical problems. The period of Classical Phenomenology has its own philosophical significance that cannot be fully perceived merely in the work of one author; we have to look for the development itself in order to see the full scope of that importance. In order to understand Patočka’s thought, seeing his exact place in the history of Classical Phenomenology is of crucial importance.
Time and Responsibility

There is an age-old tendency in philosophy to question what is otherwise taken for granted, to call for systematic critical reflection on the beliefs that are being held without much (or any) known justification. Our philosophical traditions arguably start with Socrates’ gesture of this kind, and Descartes’ gesture of a similar kind stands at the beginning of modern philosophy. However, it is with Husserl and Heidegger that this gesture becomes understood as a call for responsibility for one’s life – that is, responsibility for the intentional contents that shape both our understanding and our practical projects.

For Jan Patočka, this aspect of the project of phenomenology was of great importance. I will speak about it in connection with Patočka’s interpretation of Socrates, in connection with his philosophy of history, and in connection with Patočka’s original version of phenomenology (particularly the three movements of human life).

Jan Patočka’s Socratic Message for the 21st Century

In the last weeks of his life, Jan Patočka published a couple of short texts about Charter 77 that can be understood as a kind of political testament. The audience was not just the usual academia, but his fellow-citizens, and he addressed them in his characteristic manner: as a truly Socratic philosopher. Having read Patočka’s arguments 30 years later, I contend that his concept of human rights articulated here – somewhat disconnected from our contemporary legal and/or political discourse and rather emerging from his own lifelong philosophical inquiries – has not lost any of its significance and spiritual power. On the contrary, it seems to me that, politically speaking, it has become even more relevant today than it was in the moment when it came into existence, tested against the odd and painful political realities of communist Czechoslovakia of the 1970s.

I will focus on three questions:

First, it must be clarified what place the human rights argument exactly plays in the Patočka’s own political philosophy and how it fits to the overall context of his philosophical investigations that were first and most powerfully inspired by Husserl’s phenomenology.

Second, I will look at the connection between the Patočka’s own Socratic action within the Charter 77 dissident movement and his “Czech national philosophy”: his interpretation of the political existence of a small nation “at heart of Europe” within the modern history of Western civilization.

Third, what must be examined is the possible relevance of the Patočka’s concept of human rights in the context of contemporary political thought and jurisprudence, a message his Socratic death is conveying to those who live now, in an open world of the beginning of the 21st century.
L’expérience de l’époché

Une réflexion sur le champ phénoménal exige d’ébranler de fond en comble la base méthodique de la phénoménologie. Patočka s’arrête sur le sens profond de l’époché, thématisé par Husserl et Heidegger. Au delà de la méprise réciproque – Heidegger juge l’époché comme la construction artificielle d’une conscience détachée du monde, Husserl pense que l’angoisse montre une existence humaine perçue encore par une image psychologique – Patočka met en comparaison l’époché husserlienne et la disposition fondamentale du Dasein telle que l’angoisse. Chez les deux penseurs, il ne s’agit pas de faire usage des thèses relatives à l’étant, ni d’affirmer ni de nier, mais d’être en suspens.

Husserl n’arrive pas à expérimenter la liberté jusqu’au bout. Il recule devant l’universalisation de l’époché, qui ne laisse subsister, sur le plan de l’expérience et sur celui de l’être, aucun terrain pour une science possible. Si pour Husserl l’universalisation de l’époché était une prestation excessive, elle ne l’est pas pour Patočka. L’universalisation de l’époché signifie que la thèse du soi doit être elle aussi mise entre parenthèses. Il s’agit de comprendre le sens de cela. Encore une fois il faut souligner que l’époché n’est pas un doute, mais encore une négation. L’époché radicale ne conduit pas à une élimination du sujet, elle s’affranchit de réaliser sa validité. Elle nous conduit à ne pas faire usage de la thèse de l’ego. Loin de douter de l’indubitale, elle met hors jeu l’immédiateté de la donation de l’ego, elle s’abstient de considérer l’ego comme le point d’Archimède de l’apparition. Dans la « mise entre parenthèses » de la croyance du monde et de celui relatif au sujet, quel est le « résidu phénoménologique », c’est-à-dire que reste-t-il de la suspension radicale? Aucun étant ne restait en effet pour fonder une science possible : «rien». Mais selon Patočka « rien » ne signifie pas le pur néant : il n’est rien dont on puisse affirmer « cela est » (un étant). Il est un « il y a ».

«L’époché conçue ainsi ne donne plus accès à un étant ou à un « pré-existant », quel qu’il soit, mondain ou non mondain, mais peut-être permet-elle, pour cette raison même, d’accéder, non plus à l’apparaissante, mais à l’apparaître comme tel».

Voilà le résidu phénoménologique. Il ne s’agit ni d’un étant ni d’un pré-existant. L’époché radicale nous a conduit au-delà de la totalité de l’étant, et précisément vers les conditions de possibilité de l’apparaître, une structure pré-empirique tellement cherchée par la philosophie traditionnelle, dès son début, mais jamais découverte dans son authentique identité. L’époché accède à un a priori sans lequel aucun étant ou pré-existant ne pourrait se manifester. Patočka nomme cet « a priori » de l’apparaître ainsi que la « sphère transcendantale », un champ qui « rend possible l’apparaître de l’étant dans son essence et fournit aussi indirectement les principes de la connaissance mondaine ». Un champ universel qui, bien qu’accompagnant toute notre expérience, ne peut pas être réduit à l’expérience même car il est absolument originaire.

D’où vient cette attitude ? D’où vient cette « puissance du négatif » qui se manifeste comme liberté de la pensée, c’est-à-dire comme liberté à l’égard de l’étant en général ? L’époché nous conduit vers l’expérience de la liberté ; il s’agit d’une expérience dépouvrue de contenu objectif et subjectif, dépouvrue d’un substrat substantiel, un sujet, un prédicat ou un ensemble de prédicats. L’expérience de la liberté a la caractérisation négative d’une distance par rapport un contenu fini et positif.

Bref, il ne faut pas comprendre l’époché comme un acte spécifiquement philosophique capable de produire la liberté de l’étant, donc l’accès au champ de l’apparaître ; c’est au
contrariwise this field which finds the epoch. No fact objective and no subjective will can motivate or justify the epoch. The epoch arrives by a stroke, by a thought act of simple thought, by a change of attitude.

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Questioning as a Prerequisite for a Meaningful Protest

This paper will put forward the thesis that Jan Patočka significantly and positively influenced the political life of this country with his life and work. Patočka fulfilled his own thought that philosophy creates history and therefore is inseparable from politics. He fundamentally influenced the way individual signatories understood the meaning of Charter 77. Due to this, the Charter, in spite of its internal diversity of views, was able to resist the temptation of the nationalism that leads to provincialism. Charta 77 successfully operated for the full thirteen years until the fall of Communism, which distinguished it from the majority of dissident movements in the other Soviet Bloc countries. This ethos, which Patočka impressed onto the Charter is connected to the questioning and dialogical thinking of Patočka, especially in the last years of his life. The author recollects the Patočkian concepts of “shakenness” and “solidarity of the shaken” and especially the significance of the two short texts from February and March 1977 for the interpretation of the meaning of the Charter. In conclusion, the author emphasizes the importance of Patočka’s questioning and searching also in today’s post-historical world.

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Platonisme négatif et existence maximale chez Jan Patočka

Negative Platonism and Maximal Existence

L’exposé voudrait montrer que la volonté de radicalisation de la phénoménologie qui s’exprime chez Patočka fait exactement écho aux exigences de son « platonisme négatif ». Patočka adresse en effet à Platon et à Husserl la même critique, qui est de n’avoir pu porter à l’accomplissement le bouleversement amorcé par leurs « découvertes », ou encore de n’avoir pu soutenir jusqu’au bout, ni le paradoxe d’une détermination non objective de l’objectivité (ce qui est, selon Patočka, le vrai sens de l’Idée comme « force de déréalisation » et du khôrismos platonicien qui la spécifie), ni la radicalité de l’epokhê et de la pensée de l’apparaître qui aurait dû s’ensuivre (l’inobjectivité du phénomène, une fois découverte, étant renvoyée par le biais de la réduction à la subjectivité transcendantale, alors que, selon Patočka, « le phénomène n’est pas l’accomplissement d’une constitution subjective. Au contraire, les possibilités ‘subjectives’ elles-mêmes ne deviennent claires que ‘sur’ le phénomène. » Si donc le platonisme « positif » réifie l’Idée et se méprend ensuite sur le soin de l’âme et sur son devenir au sein du monde, de même la phénoménologie « classique » pense fautivement l’ego transcendantal au moyen d’un modèle objectiviste de la donation. Ce double retournement doit lui-même être retourné. Il pourra l’être, selon Patočka, si, d’une part, on conçoit l’epimeleia tès psykhès et l’examen de soi, l’exetasis, comme épreuves de la liberté négative par laquelle l’âme humaine « se donne une forme et amplifie son être », et si,
According to Jan Patočka’s “negative Platonism”, the usual Platonism, which is a “positive” one, makes a fundamental mistake when it formulates the genuine “discovery” of Plato – that is to say the Idea as a non-objective determination of objectivity – in terms of an ideal object that the sensible ones have to imitate. So did Plato himself misunderstand the epimeleia tès psykhès and the human self-knowledge (exetasis)?

In a similar way, Patočka states that “the classical Phenomenology fails to formulate adequately it’s own discoveries”. So does it go, on one side, because of the transcendental subjectivism of Husserlian thought or, on the other side, because Husserl could merely theorize the donation modes of an object?

These two failures have to be surpassed. Patočka intends to do so by means of a theory of the epimeleia tès psykhès and of the exetasis conceived as two basic experiences of our negative liberty – the one by which the human soul “amplifies its way to be”. Besides, the Husserlian concept of the intuitive “fulfilment” of the intentionality is to be understood (in spite of Husserl himself) as the maximalization of our way to exist, and not at all as the abolition of a previous nothingness.

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Salvation and Sacrifice: Patočka and Heidegger on the Question of Technique

In the present paper, I will discuss Patočka’s readings and interpretation of the question concerning technology presented by Martin Heidegger. Departing from a very insightful clarification about the main differences between Husserl’s and Heidegger’s understanding of technique, Patočka not only interprets Heidegger’s position in its own right, but also develops it by means of connecting the Heideggerian issue on salvation with the problem of sacrifice. My attempt is to show the central points on Patočka’s readings, the significance of connecting salvation and sacrifice in relation to the question of technique, and further to show that Patočka’s position enables us to think further about the ambiguity of modern technique as a front of ambiguity.

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Jump into Freedom: Patocka’s epoché

Patocka tried to transform the Husserlian conception of epoché within the frame of a new philosophy of human existence. The central idea is that the carrying out of the epoché is both a basic act of freedom as well as an evidence of the finiteness of man. This lecture reconstructs the systematic context of Patocka’s phenomenology of epoché by means of the pairs of contrast as praxis and theoría – act and object – finite and infinite – active and
passive – intellectual and emotional – possible and real. It shows how far Patocka realized this program of establishing a phenomenology of the pre- and outer-theoretical *epoché*, and which are the consequences for his understanding of phenomenology itself.

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*Jan Patočka’s View on Ethics*

Thinking phenomenologically requires beginning with the phenomenon itself. But what is the phenomenon when we reflect on a philosophical approach to ethics? Speaking empirically, on the one hand, ethics or morality in the sense of a normative order is a feature that occurs in all societies and thus can be seen as a universal characteristic of the lifeworld. On the other hand, there is no doubt that such normative orders very seldom emerge from philosophical reflection. Ethical systems as formulated by philosophers usually lack the capacity of being transformed into practical rules of the life in the natural attitude and, when they are realized, they seldom fulfil the original intentions of their philosophical founders. So, the philosophical approaches to ethics – and that includes phenomenology as well – reveal a paradoxical structure: Philosophy is able to formulate ethical principles and it is able to describe the general need for them as well. But as a speculative system of knowledge, philosophy usually does not bridge the gap between the realm of reflection and that of pragmatic life. Even if it calls itself a “practical philosophy,” it seldom becomes a practised one.

The phenomenological approach stressing the pre-scientific and also pre-philosophical processes of meaning-constitution allows for a productive attempt to resolve the above paradox by reversing the philosophical equation aiming at the foundation of ethics. Considered phenomenologically, the question is not how philosophy could found ethics for the lifeworld, but rather in what constitutive processes and structures of the lifeworld does it become possible for philosophy to become a practice orienting life. One of the most prominent phenomenologists who approach the problem of philosophy and ethics in this way was Jan Patočka. He adopts the Heideggerian concept of Dasein’s living in possibilities and connects it to the Enlightenment principle of discursive rationality of truth—both based on evidences resulting from a phenomenological analysis of the constitution of the lifeworld conceived as an analysis of the existential movement and its three dimensions. In this way, Patočka transcends both Heidegger and Husserl, since he uses Heideggerian concepts in order to transcend Husserl’s approach toward a philosophy of practice and, at the same time, he keeps Husserl’s rationality in order to bring Heideggerian motives into the tradition of the Enlightenment. In this sense, his practical philosophy has to fulfil three aims:

1. To keep the sight of the possibilities of existence open;
2. To look for the foundation of their selection;
3. To reveal the responsibility of the selecting and acting self for his own and the others’ lives.

So Patočka hopes to work out a phenomenological approach that allows for “an ethics, that does not refer to a higher transcendent and metaphysical world, but which nevertheless will be an ethics in the full sense, strictly demanding duties, self-transcendence and sacrifices and, at the same time, allowing for free creativity, innovation, and elasticity; an ethics that does not rely on pre-established forms, imperatives, and laws that individuals could hypocritically use to pretend their morality, but rather is based on immanent evidence, open to the risk of life and to its precariousness” (from “Eternity and Historicity”)
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*Destroyed Sense – Dispossessed World – Broken We: On Violence from an a-subjective Point of View*

The basic intention of my talk is to approach the very phenomenon of violence from an a-subjective point of view. At the outset, I will give a brief outline of Jan Patočka’s conception of a-subjective phenomenology. In this context I will recapitulate his basic ideas derived from a strong criticism of Husserl’s subjectivist approach. Special attention will be devoted here to issues of embodiment, the life-world and intersubjectivity as constituting factors of our selfhood. Against this background, I will use Patočka’s respective insights concerning the “phenomenal field” to develop a phenomenological analysis of the specific ways violence affects our selves; as I will argue, it does so by destroying incorporated patterns of understanding, by oppressing the meaningful frameworks of our pre-given life-world, and, finally, by undermining our primordial trust in the other.

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*Europe et soin de l’âme chez Patočka*

« Le souci de l’âme constitue le thème central autour duquel se cristallise le projet de vie de l’Europe. Reste à déterminer ce que c’est que l’âme au sens dont il y va pour nous, et ce que c’est que le souci de l’âme. Pourquoi se soucier de l’âme ? » C’est dans le séminaire privé de l’été 1973, alors démis du poste de professeur à l’université Charles suite au Printemps de Prague, que Jan Patočka reprend une critique phénoménologique des concepts de la métaphysique traditionnelle. Et il n’est pas anodin que ce retour se produise dans une situation de détresse, tant politique que personnelle – comme elle le fut au début des années 50, après le Coup de Prague, période durant laquelle Patočka rédigea son essai sur le « platonisme négatif » (*negativní platonismus*): dans la crise du temps présent, la réflexion philosophique s’ouvre à sa propre histoire, pour juger de la pertinence des concepts au regard des événements, déterminer si elle peut encore sauver et comment elle le peut. En l’occurrence, il s’agit de saisir ce dont il y va pour nous du concept métaphysique d’âme. Question d’autant plus nécessaire et urgente, selon Patočka, que l’âme exprime le sens profond de notre histoire européenne et détient le secret de son ultime chance de salut.

“The care of soul constitutes the central theme around which crystallizes the project of European life. But the sense of soul for us remains to be determined, and also what is the care of soul. Why should we take care of soul ?” In the private summer seminar of 1973, at that time dismissed from his post of professor at Charles University after Prague Spring, Jan Patočka renews with a phenomenological criticism of traditional metaphysical concepts. And it is not trivial that this comeback occurs in a situation of distress, both political and personal, as it was at the beginning of fifties, when Patočka wrote his essay on “negative Platonism” (*negativní platonismus*): in the crisis of present time, philosophical thought opens up to its own history, in order to judge the relevancy of concepts with regard to events, to determine if it could still save and how it could do it. As it is, we must get what means the metaphysical
concept of soul for us. Necessary and urgent question, according to Patočka, since the soul expresses the deep sense of our European history and keeps the secret of its last chance of salvation.

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Patočka on Techno-Power and the Sacrificial Victim (Oběť)

The Czech philosopher Jan Patočka, one of the last students of Edmund Husserl, is not widely known in Anglo-American philosophy. If known at all, he is mostly regarded as the interpreter of Husserl. In 1995, the publication of the English translation of Jacques Derrida’s book *Gift of Death* brought Patočka a broader philosophical audience. Although Derrida’s work has brought attention to Patočka’s work, the idiosyncrasy of Derrida’s exposition has masked the true nature and importance of Patočka’s philosophy.

In this paper, I present a reading of Patočka’s work that deals with the existential crisis of today’s society. For Patočka, the existential crisis of today’s society and the recurrence of wars disguised as peace are two sides of the same problem. They are the outcome of the transformation of nature into a standing reserve of energy for humans to use as they see fit. Stripped of unpredictable and contingent elements, nature is transformed into a formal system written in mathematical symbols that can be potentially understood by everyone, everywhere and every time. If the book of nature is written in the characters of geometry, as Galileo thought, then the idea of responsibility for the nature in which we live is not clear. How is one to think about responsibility for triangles and circles? To think of nature in such a manner seems to absolve humans from any responsibility for it. Yet not everything in the world is open to such calculative transfiguration. For Patočka, the phenomenon of the sacrificial victim and our own death are examples of the impossibility of calculation, and therefore also of prediction, which is the *sine qua non* of the modern scientific knowledge. Patočka’s exposition offers a way to confront an understanding that is based on calculation alone. The phenomenon of sacrifice can initiate a challenge to our techno-scientific understanding of the world by showing the futility of attempts to simply use objective – in the sense of formal – knowledge to account for the world we live in: the natural world.

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The Problem of Negative Platonism

Patočka’s concept of the phenomenology of natural world always has two aspects: first, it is strictly related to the threefold existential movement of human being in the world, in other words it has ethical and existential relevance; second, the phenomenology of the natural world can not be separated from the concept of phenomenon either. After presenting these two subjects, I try to show that the problem of freedom and that of appearance are not completely separated, but they have a very important meeting point: the negative Platonism. Among Patočka’s other relevant philosophical insights, this seems to be one of the most fruitful, and at the same time one of the less discussed ideas. The concept of negative
Platonism not only shows the way towards an ethics without metaphysics, but it opens up a new approach to the phenomenon without ideal-eidetic structure as well. We can also find arguments in Patočka’s late manuscripts (Vom Erscheinen als solchem. Texte aus dem Nachlass) that these two aspects are strictly interrelated and mutually dependent.

In the last part of my presentation I try to explore the connections between the negative Platonism and a central problem of every transcendental philosophy from Kant to Husserl: that of schematism. I suppose that the concept of negative Platonism can be considered as a new answer to the classical question: how intuitive contents meet conceptual form. The originality of his solution consists in the fact that Patočka tries to answer this question in a non-epistemological way.
Sensings and Bodies: A Feminist Reading of Husserl’s Ideas II

What does Husserlian phenomenology have to offer feminist theory? More specifically, can feminisms of embodiment find resources in Husserl’s account of living bodies for rethinking traditional philosophical representations of “the body,” in its passivity, instrumentality and subordination to consciousness? In the past two decades, feminist thinkers from diverse philosophical backgrounds have forcefully argued that the project of critically reconceiving embodiment is one that feminist theory cannot afford to ignore. If, as Elizabeth Grosz points out, the body has been the silenced side of a dichotomy upon which the supremacy of the (masculinist, patriarchal) mind has been constructed – and if woman has been representationally correlated with that body – then feminisms that disavow embodiment risk upholding the dichotomy that has traditionally subordinated women. This is not to say that feminism should accept the body as traditionally defined (as the negative mirror or other to mind). What Grosz calls for is a rethinking of embodiment that overcomes the dichotomy of mind-body (and I would add, activity-passivity and subject-object). This work has been done by feminists drawing on different philosophical methodologies, phenomenological, psychoanalytic, Bergsonian-Deleuzian, etc. My paper aims to continue this rethinking of embodiment in a phenomenological, specifically Husserlian, vein that has so far been largely disregarded by feminists. This despite several calls in recent years to look at Husserl more closely, and despite potential openings from within Husserlian phenomenology owing to the posthumous publication of manuscripts on affectivity and time. In this paper, I will first address why I think feminists have had good reason to be reticent about appealing to Husserlian phenomenology for support. I will then present the resources that I think Husserl’s account of the body holds for feminism, and end with a reminder of some of the shortcomings in Husserl’s approach to the body that must be kept in mind in any feminist appropriation.

Befriending Science: Subjectivity and Science in McDowell and Husserl

This paper will examine that point in Mind and World where McDowell offsets the dominance of natural science by introducing his notion of “second nature,” to once again “place minds in the world.” The paper contrasts his take on science with that articulated in Husserl’s great work on the science-philosophy relationship, the Crisis. It then explains how
an implementation of the transcendental reduction would have enabled McDowell to appreciate better the subjective viewpoint of science and his own philosophical viewpoint in introducing his counterpoint to science, second nature; to see better the continuity between science and second nature; and to recognize with greater thoroughness and in accord with his purposes the pervasiveness of our intentional relationship to the world.

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Phenomenologist at work

This paper offers some methodological Selbstbesinnung on a larger investigation of interkinaesthetic affectivity (taking “affection” primarily in terms of the Husserl of, e.g., the C manuscripts). I assume the transcendental-phenomenological epochē and reduction, as well as the eidetic reduction, and focus on the methods of critique of presuppositions; retrieval from anonymity; and radical reduction to the living present. Along with the correlational retrieval of constituting consciousness per se, we may also speak of a stratificational retrieval that discloses non-actional yet co-functioning performances (and their correlates) at various “levels.” However, something taken as the “lowest” stratum in static phenomenology (e.g., sheer material nature as the correlate of an objectivating act upon which “higher” levels of feeling and willing are founded) is revealed by a generative phenomenological analysis to be the correlate of certain historical achievements. And although Husserl also uses the “strata” model in speaking of a genetic phenomenological “archaeology,” he runs into the problem of having to “reconstruct” ultimate origins buried deep in the past, raising questions of Evidenz. I therefore suggest that rather than carrying out either a static analysis of hierarchical founding-founded relations or a genetic search for origins, we can engage in dynamic analysis of the ongoing functional efficacy of the (usually unthematic) moments “through” which more encompassing wholes are given. For example, a radical reduction to the primal standing-streaming living present can help us to retrieve both “affection” and “apperception” as mutually co-founding, interfunctioning moments of ongoing transcendental life. More specifically, temporarily holding in abeyance the integrative syntheses whereby sensuous moments are apperceived as adumbrations-“of” objects not only allows us to investigate the event of affection itself on the one hand and the “constitutive history” of the presuppositions stemming from “hidden apperceptive traditionality” on the other, but also opens up the possibility of the institution of alternative apperceptions-“as.” I close by returning to the theme of the larger project on interkinaesthetic affectivity and identifying a crisis in embodiment to which Patočka’s work can be seen as a response.

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Husserl’s Theory of Sensation (Empfindung)

In this paper, I wish to present an analysis of Edmund Husserl’s concept of sensation (Empfindung) and its development from the Logical Investigations to the first transcendental breakthrough of Thing and Space, and through Ideas I to III.
The first short section of the paper is devoted to different understandings of the notion of sensation, with its threefold formal structure, and some epistemological and ontological problems tied to them. These are then related to Husserl’s distinction between intentional and non-intentional mental processes (Erlebnisse), which leads to the question of whether there is a special mechanism or mental operation that mediates between both types and transforms their respective “objects”. Husserl’s notion of apprehension (Auffassung) is shown to fulfil this function in two manners, as two forms of “phenomenal equivocity”. From the constitutive continuity and temporal dependence of sensations we will move towards the thematic of the body as the centre of the perceptive and kinaesthetic field, in which Empfindnisse are constituted by a primordial synthesis.

The following section deals with some criticisms raised against Husserl’s conceptualisation (in the period this paper covers) by phenomenologists like Gurwitsch, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, or Landgrebe. The first argument claims that a perspective on sensations as elementary “building blocks” of perception that can be singled out in experience is misleading. The second argument claims that there is no such thing as an element of consciousness, which is not already bestowed with meaning and that apprehension as an extra mechanism is theoretically superfluous. After reviewing these criticisms, I will relate them again to Husserl’s analyses concerning bodily constitution and kinaesthetic experience which can be used to relativise some of the criticism. Finally, I will take the seemingly paradoxical notion of “pure sensation” as an example with which some aspects of objectification in phenomenological reflection in general can be clarified.

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What Phenomenology has to Say about Grounding the Ethical

It is widely recognized that Husserlian phenomenology has had little to say about ethics, and treatment of how its analysis of transcendental constitution might or might not affect the establishing of an ethics seems largely undeveloped. One possibility is that it has little if anything to offer of the kind, an idea that could be justified by allusion to the “meontic” character of transcendental phenomenology that Eugen Fink lays out for it in his “Sixth Cartesian Mediation” (though in a somewhat indirect way), but far more explicitly in his working notes from the years he spent working with Husserl from 1928 to 1938. I lay out that basic “meontic” character specifically in its preclusion of any “metaphysical” grounding of ethics—a position apparently shared by Jan Patočka in his Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History; but I then I wish to show that there are at least two ways in which ethics can be taken as prepared for by the phenomenology of the transcendental constitution of the world. For one, human being can be considered the concrete actualization of transcendental constitution (a point expressed in Husserl’s Krisis-writings), and Fink worked out conceptions for refining this idea, even if only in his notes. For another, the comprehensive “product” of transcendental constitution is the unitary field of intuitional intentionality-and-phenomenal-manifestation, the field of world-horizontal appearing which is specifically the field of sense-and-meaning. This sense-meaning field in turn be may begin as the sense of ground-level perceptual experience, but it is quickly taken up in its being articulated and refashioned as meaning in modalities of memory, imagination, and reflective understanding, in great part via the expressive functions of language. Finally what is proposed is that the field of sense and meaning is specifically the field of freedom, in that the linkages and coherencies of sense and
meaning, in being sui generis, cannot be reduced to naturalistic causal processes and determinacy. Accordingly, in that it is in this “field of sense-and-meaning” that the possibilities for both political and ethical discourse can develop, phenomenology after all makes a positive contribution to the grounding and understanding of ethics, even if without determining any specific kind of ethical system.

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Husserl and Phenomenology of History

In what respect today, after the consumption of that theoretical perspective which understood Husserlian phenomenology as a “consciencealism” and “idealism”, can one return to Husserl? Phenomenology presents itself today as a go-between, a bridge stretched to the horizon of problems and urgencies of our century, starting from that of rethinking the relationships between individuals, populations and cultures. If one wants to pursue structures pertaining to all human beings, beyond cultural differences and the peculiar combinations of Erlebnisse which justify them, it is not necessary to reduce history to perception, after having set them one against the other: the point is rather that of investigating, with the rigorous proceeding of phenomenology, the teleology “in which the universal being of transcendental subjectivity consists” (Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität – 1929-35, p. 380).

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The Vocation of Motherhood: Husserl and Feminist Ethics

In the following I would like to explore a confrontation between Husserl’s ethical position of vocation and its absolute ought with a feminist ethical position. It might at first seem that feminist ethics would have much about which to be critical in Husserl’s ethics. However, on closer inspection, I will argue that Husserl’s ethics has a great deal to offer a feminist ethics by providing for the possibility of an ethics that is particular rather than universal, and that recognizes the role of the social in establishing values and norms without conceding the ethical responsibility of the individual. In order to make this case, I will proceed with a very brief review of Husserl’s position of the absolute ought, some typical criticisms that might be leveled at his position, and finally, responses to those criticisms that will show ways in which Husserl’s position can be beneficial to the formulation of a feminist ethics.
The Goods that Bind

Elizabeth Anscombe’s scathing critique of what she called “modern moral philosophy” in both its deontological and consequentialist forms underlies, at least in part, the resurgence of interest in virtue ethics. Central to her critique is the claim that philosophers should desist from doing moral philosophy until they have an adequate philosophy of psychology. Where Anscombe calls for a philosophy of psychology, Brentano had already supplied a descriptive-psychological account of evaluative presentations on the basis of which Husserl developed his phenomenological account of valuation and volition. While Husserl goes beyond Anscombe’s and Brentano’s appeals to psychology in the direction of a transcendental phenomenology, his efforts fill the same gap by providing a more adequate descriptive account of our morally relevant experiences and of the concepts central to them. My aim in this paper is to build upon certain of Husserl’s ideas regarding the intentional structure of acts of valuation and volition in order to sketch a particular contemporary understanding of a virtue-theoretical approach to ethics, and this returns us to the line of thought animating Anscombe’s critique.

When Does the End not Justify the Means?

Things that can become ends and means are described separately with respect to the uses, values, and belief characteristics they include, next they are related as ends and means, and then the possibilities of means justifying ends and of ends justifying means are examined. Particular ends do not justify means if the things that are willed as ends do not require the things that can be means or when other ends outweigh them.

The role of evidence in Husserl's conception of logic

The aim of this paper is to explain the role of evidence in the Formal and Transcendental Logic (1929, hereafter FTL) by examining Husserl’s indebtedness to Plato. Husserl opens the FTL with a remark that “Science in a new sense arises in the first instance from Plato’s establishing of logic”. Few years earlier, for example in his lecture course Erste Philosophie (1923-24) Husserl had credited Plato for creating the ideal of scientific rationality and Socratic-Platonic self-examination as a method with which to justify knowledge. Husserl held that one can bring complete insight and evidence to scientific rationality by means of Platonic dialectic. Accordingly my aim is to show that, in a similar manner, the role of the various kinds of evidences in the Formal and Transcendental Logic is to bring complete insight to scientific rationality, in this “Socratic-Platonic” sense.
I will first discuss the sources of Husserl’s indebtedness to Plato beginning with his reading of Lotze’s Logik in the early 1890s to his discussion of other, non-logical Platonic concepts such as eros in the late teens, and ultimately the development to the most fully Platonist works in the 1920s. After this I will attempt to give a general sketch of what Husserl’s reading of Plato might have been relying mainly on Jacob Klein’s reading of the divided line in the Republic. In the end I will discuss the sense in which the Formal and Transcendental Logic is a Platonist work. It is so in many ways. Here I would like to draw the attention to the role of evidence in the FTL, which is to provide logic and exact sciences with a philosophical foundation as what Plato attempts to do in his discussion of the divided line of the Republic. Thus the role of evidence in Husserl's conception of logic is to bring original completeness to logic. Completeness here, however, does not mean completeness of a system, but rather thematic completeness of a research project, which itself is never-ending.

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From Violence to Evidence: Husserl and Sen on Human Identity and Diversity

In a series of texts from the “Prague Treatise” and the “Prague Letter” (1934), through the “Vienna Lecture” and the “Prague Lectures” (1935), to the Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (1936), Edmund Husserl focuses on the problem and potential of the identity of European humanity. It is evident, according to his descriptions, that the crisis of the European sciences particularly, the crisis of European humanity specifically, and the crisis of world humanity generally are inextricably linked phenomena. It is also evident, according to these descriptions, that the crisis of European humanity is inevitably a crisis of European identity too, and that the crisis of European identity is ineluctably a crisis of human identity as well. Yet the issue of human identity is still a vexed one, and Amartya Sen has recently devoted considerable attention to it in his book Violence and Identity: The Illusion of Destiny (2006). The argument of the work consists of an extended and detailed analysis of how a few human beings use the illusion of destiny to do violence to the identity of many of their fellow human beings by getting them to see themselves in terms of a singular or solitary unique identity instead of in terms of the plural, different, and disparate but shared identities that make them not only who they are but also diversely different from one another. The aim of this paper is to investigate both Husserl’s and Sen’s approaches to human identity and diversity, in order to evaluate their relative merits and demerits as well as to explore their respective applications to and implications for contemporary human beings.

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Husserl on the Imaginary Numbers

Husserl started out with the idea of founding the validity of arithmetic on an analysis of the concept of number, an analysis that, in line with both Weierstrass and Brentano, was quite philosophical and psychological. In the beginning Husserl held a relatively simplistic position, which can be found in several early chapters of the Philosophy of Arithmetic and is
also critically described in his famous letter to Stumpf of February 1890. Recognising the significant epistemological and ontological problems posed by his approach when dealing with entities such as imaginary numbers (i.e. \(\sqrt{-1}\)), Husserl slowly distanced himself from his former masters and vastly improved his position in the last phases of writing the *Philosophy of Arithmetic*. Through various influences, among which we count Kronecker and Riemann, he came to conclude that the justification of calculating with imaginary concepts was due to the properties of the system of axioms or operations, i.e. their being definite. The problem of justifying the use of imaginary concepts in mathematics will be a lasting problem for Husserl, appearing prominently as the main topic of his lecture for the mathematical society in Göttingen (the famous Doppelvortrag) and also in later lectures, such as an advanced mathematical seminar in 1905. We begin our analysis of Husserl’s position concerning the justification of the imaginary in mathematics when he was still a student in Berlin.

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*Consciousness Revisited: John Dewey and Edmund Husserl*

The twentieth century in philosophy opened with two radical, *experience based* philosophies: pragmatism and phenomenology. In this paper I will focus specifically upon the putative roles of “consciousness” as described and analysed by John Dewey and Edmund Husserl. Husserl’s strategy was to attempt a purely descriptive analysis of consciousness using a set of tactics to ‘reduce’ his analysis to a form of pure consciousness. The *epoche*, phenomenologicial reductions, bracketing, and the ultimate reduction to *transcendental consciousness* were elaborated and repeated in various forms during most of his early to mid-career. Contrarily, John Dewey held that ‘consciousness’ was an *abstraction* and perhaps even an illusion, which artificially separated this presumed experience from both nature and sociality, thus in effect denying the possibility of a Husserlian styled phenomenology. I propose to develop a careful comparative critique of this opposition which will find tensions between such notions as the ‘natural attitude’ and a ‘naturalist’ approach; between notions of different characteristics of experience; and then look at the outcomes for each approach with respect to contemporary issues such as science, knowledge, and fallibilism.

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*The Vagaries of Wesen: A Practical Matter*

The author poses the question why, in spite of Husserl’s emphasis on clarity and his kinship to positivism, his followers have so often turned to irrationalism. Husserl defines phenomenology as *deskriptive Wesenslehre der reinen Erlebnisse*. That presupposes direct *seeing* of *Wesen*. If we understand *Wesen* as traditional “essence”, such seeing could only be mystical intuition. Author proposes reading *Wesen* as function which renders given activity meaningful (“bestows meaning”). If we conceive of that function as a structural function within a meaningful system of purposive activity, we avoid both mysticism and subjectivism.
Author does not claim such was Husserl’s intent, only that it enables phenomenology to grasp meaning structures of experienced reality – which he takes to be the meaning of definition cited earlier.

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Revisiting the Personal Surrounding World: Toward the Phenomenon of Nature

In this paper I will argue that Ideas II begins the process of dismantling (Abbau) the nature/spirit dichotomy by grounding this distinction in the internally unified relation between the lived Body (Leib) and the personal surrounding world (Umwelt). This negotiation of the nature/spirit dichotomy can be seen through the transition in Ideas II from the naturalistic attitude to the personalistic attitude. This shift is not merely a turn to the category of spirit over and against nature, but retains the underlying basis of nature through the embodied constitution of the Umwelt in the personalistic attitude. The articulation of the personal surrounding world brings about a naturalization of spirit and a spiritualization of nature, which is to say, it encompasses the most fundamental constitutive features of both the natural and human sciences.

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Question of language and the possibility of original presentation: Deconstruction of Husserlian Phenomenology Revisited

The aim of the paper is to discuss the cogency of Derridian critique of Husserl’s philosophy, as well as to inquire about the possible contribution of such a critique to profounder understanding of phenomenology. Deconstruction of Husserlian theories of time and language is here scrutinised in the context of Derrida’s own assumptions and in confrontation with Husserl’s writings themselves, including those of late Husserl. The thesis of the paper is that the deconstruction is a valuable method of philosophy not as a tool of destroying phenomenology, but as a tool of dismantling metaphysics of presence at the service of phenomenology. Then the issue of the status of deconstruction as a philosophical method should also be posed. Derrida’s critique of Husserl rests on exposing the otherness working within and despite the most essential Husserlian distinctions. The otherness essentially present in the source of any presence, i.e. in the phenomenological intuition itself and the subject of this intuition, deconstructs this presence and hence the possibility of phenomenology. Such an interpretation of deconstruction is common to most of both adherents and critics of Derrida. Thus the deconstruction is seen as a natural antagonist of any phenomenological thinking. The paper proposes to revise this interpretation, and puts assumed opposition between phenomenology and deconstruction into question. Following Derrida’s analyses, it examines whether his critique of Husserl exposes erroneous assumptions of phenomenology, or it should be rather treated as a helpful instrument for deepening phenomenological analyses. It attempts to show that Derridian critique actually delineates borders of phenomenological
research rather than questioning its weight and possibility; that the otherness disclosed by
deconstruction within phenomenology does not undermine phenomenology, but it is
necessary for the reliable phenomenological research; that deconstruction forces one to
reconsider certain Husserlian analyses and their consequences rather than crossing them out;
that it supplements such analyses with important issues rather than remaining a form of their
sceptical dismantlement.
The paper focuses on the scrutiny of Derridian researches on the vital issue of consciousness
of time, as well as on the issue of language, which is less central to Husserl, but was taken by
Derrida as paradigmatic for philosophical appropriation of otherness. Analysing critically
Derridian description of the interweaving of sign, language and original presentation, the
paper shows that this interconnection does not menace Husserl’s philosophy, but is rather
disclosed and described by Husserl himself.
Yet the object of examination is not only phenomenology in the deconstructive perspective.
Confronting Derridian argumentation with various passages from Husserl and inquiring about
the sense of Derrida’s metaphors, the paper offers a kind of revision of common
understanding of deconstruction as a philosophical method as well.

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From Being to Givenness and Back:
Some Remarks on the Meaning of Transcendental Idealism in Kant and Husserl

This paper takes a fresh look at a classical theme in modern philosophy. I present Kant’s
transcendental idealism as a theory distinguishing between the world as in-itself and as given
to the experiencing human being. This reconstruction provides the backdrop for Husserl’s
transcendental phenomenology as a brand of transcendental idealism expanding on Kant:
Through the phenomenological reduction Husserl universalizes Kant’s transcendental
philosophy into an eidetic science of subjectivity. Thereby, Husserl provides a new sense of
transcendental philosophy, rephrases the ‘quid iuris?’ and furnishes a new conception of the
thing-in-itself. What needs to be clarified is not the possibility of a priori cognition, but
instead the validity of objects that give themselves in experience. The thing-in-itself is not an
unknowable object, but the idea of the object in all possible appearances at once. In all these
innovations Husserl remains committed to the basic sense in which Kant conceived the
Copernican Turn.

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Husserl, Aristotle and the Equivocity of Sign

Husserl’s treatment of the notion of sign has been at the center of a huge debate over the last
forty years. Following Derrida, post-modern philosophers have been paying particular
attention to a number of problematical issues related to Husserl’s denial of a general formal
structure shared by both, expression and indication. On the other hand, many
phenomenologists, in order to answer those criticisms, go as far as to present Husserl’s
semiotics as a consistent theory, based on a clear and univocal general concept of sign. Such a debate has run parallel to the rediscovery of Aristotle’s semiotics. Scholars have noticed since the early seventies that Aristotle seems to use the concept of “semeion” in a quite equivocal way. Thus, most of them have been trying to put some order into the reining confusion, looking for an univocal notion of sign. The aim of my paper is to offer a crossed analysis of both Husserl’s First Logical Investigation and Aristotle’s Prior Analytics, 27, in order to show the legitimacy of an equivocal treatment of the concept of sign. I will claim, therefore, that Husserl and Aristotle’s analyses are consistent because (and not in spite) of their denial to consider “sign as a genus”. I will finally argue that, through a critical account of the relationship between indication and judgment, they both offer a severe criticism of the nowadays very popular, yet highly problematic, general concept of “semiotics”.

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Life as ergon: An Aristotelian Idea in Husserl’s Ethics

This paper presents Husserl’s argumentation for the idea of a truly ethical life against the backdrop of Aristotle’s conception of our best achievable end. Both Husserl in the first half of the 1920s and Aristotle conceive of the essential human life as something, which is universally guided by reason. They both develop their conceptions of an ethical life by way of comparing it with forms of life, which are strongly influenced by our professions. They finally conceive of the ethical life as something that can only come close to a deep personal satisfaction when man follows its essential destination, which is defined by the use of reason.

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An Application of Husserlian Phenomenology to Questions of Discourse and Gender

This paper falls under the rubric of the panel topic: “Husserlian Approaches to Sexual Difference”. The paper addresses the current academic argument that discourse is the only ground upon which I can experience anything, including my own body. After carrying out an analysis in order to work through how this might be possible from a phenomenological perspective, I then move to consider the possibility of experiences that might reveal the contrary position, i.e., that embodied consciousness is its own ground for experiences that may arise prior to their involvement in discursive practices. Finally, I consider whether the existence of different bodies might be a challenge to the universality of the transcendental ego, and how we might be able to “experience”, indirectly, the embodied experiences of another subject. I conclude that Husserl’s notion of a shared world, the Lebenswelt, is actually a source for hope, i.e., that it provides the ground for communication between different groups and individuals with seemingly incommensurable experiences.

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Words like “image” and “imagination” evoke a wide range of diverse phenomena: pictures, fancies, recollections and so forth. All these phenomena have manifestly something in common in spite of their respective differences. In my paper I attempt to show how the basic threefold structure identified by Husserl in the analysis of picture consciousness (Image-Thing, Object of the Image, Subject of the Image) provides a useful orientation in order to rigorously classify this complicate domain. In particular, it allows to highlight the essential differences between imaginative phenomena in terms of different configurations pertaining the activation of the three poles of the structure at issue, accounting at the same time for their interrelationship. This lays the foundations a) to gain a transcendentally purified view on image and imagination and b) to embark on a genetic account of the imaginative domain.

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Wesen und Wesensgesetze in der deskriptiven Eidetik Edmund Husserls


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The Question of Categoriality in Husserl's Analysis of Perception and Heidegger’s Reception of It

At a certain point of his Prolegomena to the History of the Concept of Time Heidegger remarks that perception according to Husserl’s analysis is permeated by categorial elements. Husserl has claimed that there are two types of categorial acts: acts of linguistic-predicative synthesis and acts of ideation. And, as we know, he also argued both against the predicative
syntheticity of perceptual objects and for the presupposition of an eidos (or sense) for their possibility. Does, then, Heidegger argue that, in Husserl’s actual analyses, perception is—after all—treated as a predicative act or/and that the presupposition of the eidos is neglected? Careful interpretation shows that, contrary to both Heidegger’s allusions elsewhere and the views expressed in the relevant secondary literature, neither of these alternatives corresponds to the fundamental focus of Heidegger’s remark. What I plan to elucidate in the paper is the meaning of this categoriality, the issue of whether (and in what sense) Husserl’s theory of perception presupposes it, and its place in Heidegger’s development from his early treatment of the question of Being to his Being and Time.

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What Can Husserl’s “Transcendental” Phenomenology Do For Mathematics?

‘Truth lies within Understanding’ or ‘Understanding measures out Truth’ place in maxim what is at once radical and elaborate in Plato. They do the same for Leibniz and Husserl.

The family of senses of ‘understanding’ at issue here have to do with conditions of thought or intelligence by virtue of which, by a sort of double-reflection, not only are [1] explanations (N.B., in the sense of clarifying, of bringing to a condition of clarity and distinctness), justifications, demonstrations, verifications, validations, … and so on are intelligently or insightfully produced, but [2] the limits or horizons of their [= the explanations, justifications, etc] coverage, adequacy, sense, validity, rightness… and so on are discerned and appreciated as well. Plato called ‘dialectic’ an uncompromising art or discipline of intelligence we best use when we seek to work up, to develop, to cultivate, and to refine our understanding. In a “strict science” or episteme of a subject matter, there will be first principles or (as we’d say) axioms from which full knowledge of the subject matter is developed by means of valid deduction. The first principles or axioms are typically regarded as not themselves being deduced from other principles (for otherwise those other principles would be the first principles). Rather the first principles or axioms are arrived at, and more or less concurrently validated, by way of our understanding. And in order to so arrive and validate, we will most likely have had to develop our understanding by a perhaps quite extended exercise in dialectic.

I will use ‘dialectic’ here to mean ways of methodically working up our understanding, but covering ways not covered by Plato.

Typically, the sort(s) of understanding at issue here are regarded as being founded on idealities,--“ideas”, “notions”, “concepts”, “conceptions”, “meanings”,…,and so on. Dialectic develops understanding by distinctively self-critical “reflections on”, “analyses of”, “reasonings with”, … and so on of such particular idealities in relation to subject matters (e.g., physical nature, living nature, number, geometric spatiality, …) of (typically) cognitive or scientific interest.

It was fundamental to Leibniz that his understanding of true proposition of a subject matter is such that every proposition, necessary or contingent, past, present or future, … (as relevant to the subject matter) is grounded in the idea of the subject matter. [I’ve reworded Leibniz in order to better align his thinking with our thinking.] We of course know not to construe Leibniz as meaning that all truths are “analytic truths” based on the idea of the subject matter. However, indeed, the correct sense of ‘grounded’ here would shape the nature of the cogent
dialectic here, for understanding here is achieved by somehow digging into the idea of the subject matter in order to discover how and in what senses truths of the subject matter are grounded in the idea.

Unfortunately, Leibniz, not wholly unlike Plato, apotheosized (or brought under the spell of an apotheosis) both the relevant ideas and the conditions of groundedness, with the effect of putting so much of truth beyond human reason and without much in the way of clear and distinct ideas of paths to such truth that didn’t place truth at an infinite terminus.

I spoke above about understanding being two-sided, [1], [2]. The second side [2] is that of a clear and distinct idea of the horizons or limits of validity or sense of our thought, deliberation, reasoning,… aimed at truth. In fact, however, this theme had not been much developed. Kant’s great achievement in the *Critique of Pure Reason* was to quite powerfully open up the possibility that [2] could itself be rationally developed and from the point of view of effective human reason or, rather, dialectic (in our sense). Of course it is now beyond all doubt that Kant’s development of understanding was quite seriously flawed, not least in his “understanding” [1] & [2] in reference to mathematical subject matters. But de jure and, with some certainty, de facto, it was Kant opening up the possibility of achieving understanding [2] with as considerable a rigour of thought that one has patience for that prepared the way for, and motivated, Husserl in his creation of pure or transcendental phenomenology, which could provide a perhaps definitive dialectic.

HUSSERL’S INTERVENTION. The most suggestive and clarifying heuristic to Husserl’s “transcendental phenomenology”, which is a foundation for a “dialectic” (‘transcendental logic’ generously conceived) adequate to produce understanding meeting the ideal conditions [1] and [2], at least as far as they can be humanly met, is to be found in the Aristotelian expectation that from a sufficiently rational telos or final cause, we can reason backwards (Aristotelian dialectic, we might say) to strong and cogent conditions on the relevant formal, efficient and material causes that can lead us to the gaining or realizing of that end. The principal “dialectical” structure over which Husserl worked is summed thus:

INTENTION (what one has in mind to do or bring about)
FULFILL (realization of what one had in mind to do or bring about)
INTENTIONAL ACTIVITIES (activities aimed at FULFILLING the INTENTION)
EVIDENZ [ (1) the recognition or apprehension that what has been done or brought about FULLFILLS the INTENTION, (2) the recognition or apprehension that INTENTIONAL ACTIVITIES undertaken satisfy conditions assuring that their eventual end result FULLFILLS the INTENTION. ]

The natural occurrence of such INTENTION occurs in projects, for example in the major project of doing geometry and in subprojects in symbiosis with the major project of doing geometry such as solving problems, devising and proving theorems, exploring the geometric properties of length, area, volume, curvature, etcetc. What Husserl studied to within some considerable (albeit varying) elaboration was the structures of meaning (Sinn) by virtue of which there can be (rational) INTENTION, and how to work up an understanding of particular such meaning- or Sinn-directed projects (such as govern the major project of doing geometry as well as the as it were symbiotic meanings which govern those subprojects). If the INTENTION is that of acquiring perfect understood cognition of a subject matter (e.g., geometric spatiality), we can see how Husserl’s dialectic (phenomenological description and analysis directed toward Sinne, the meaning complexes supporting rational INTENTION) makes far-reaching sense of Leibniz’s “understanding of true proposition of a subject matter is such that every proposition, necessary or contingent, past, present or future, … (as relevant to the subject matter) is grounded in the idea of the subject matter.”
This rather abstract sketch will be illustrated (in the paper delivered) by sufficiently simple but non-trivial examples of how it is that phenomenological “dialectic” can vastly contribute, and in a systematic and rigorous way, to understanding in mathematics.

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Phenomenology and transcendental argument in mathematics: the case of Brouwer’s “bar theorem”

On the intended interpretation of intuitionistic logic, Heyting’s Proof Interpretation, a proof of a proposition of the form $p \rightarrow q$ consists in a construction method that transforms any possible proof of $p$ into a proof of $q$. This involves the notion of the totality of all proofs in an essential way, and this interpretation has therefore been objected to on grounds of impredicativity, notably by Gödel. In fact this hardly ever leads to problems as in proofs of implications usually nothing more is assumed about a proof of the antecedent than that it indeed is one, and this assumption does not require a further grasp of the totality of proofs.

The prime example of an intuitionistic theorem that goes beyond that assumption is Brouwer’s proof of the “bar theorem”:

For every tree $x$, if $x$ contains a decidable subset of nodes such that every path through the tree meets it (a “bar”), then there is a well-ordered subtree of $x$ that contains a bar for the whole of $x$.

Instantiated with an arbitrary tree $t$, this proposition takes the form $P(t) \rightarrow Q(t)$. Brouwer’s proof of the bar theorem mainly consists in an analysis of the inner structure that a proof of $P(t)$ must have, where proofs are taken to be primarily mental objects. So here Brouwer engages in phenomenological reflection by considering the acts in which we think about bars. From that analysis he obtains the information from which to construct a proof of $Q(t)$.

In this talk I will argue that Brouwer circumvents the problem of impredicativity by resorting to a transcendental argument based on phenomenological description. A transcendental argument is here understood as an argument of the form: "We have mental experience $E$, it is a necessary condition for having this experience that $P$, therefore $P'". Then I will (1) relate these considerations to the remarkable change that Gödel’s view on the Proof Interpretation underwent between his Yale Lecture (1941) and the Dialectica paper (1958), and (2) consider how such a transcendental argument fits into Husserl’s phenomenology.