In this paper I aim at showing how a disciplined second-person methodology can be built up as a phenomenological alternative to the hard problem. My contention in this respect is that "third-person" protocols are not neutral, that is, true independently of the very situatedness of each subject in its own individuated space and time but require to consider "first-person" accounts and furthermore are inherently dependent on specific "second-person" validations. So I want to take seriously the multifarious varieties of second-person involvements within the whole process of validation and aim at understanding how scientific objectivity is in the last instance radically founded on and determined by such intersubjective practices. In short, in my view, the second person is not a formal and rigid entity but a relational dynamics of different mediating figures. In the last instance I therefore would like to lay the hypothesis that two Husserl-key concepts of intersubjectivity, empathy and openess, are central leading-threads of this disciplined second-person methodology.
Keywords(3): 1) second-person methodology 2)phenomenology 3) empathy/openness
Selected references: Depraz Natalie (1995), Transcendance et incarnation, le statut de l'intersubjectivité comme altérité à soi chez E. Husserl, Paris, Vrin. Depraz Natalie (1999), "The phenomenological reduction as praxis" in JCS. Special Issue : The View from Within, F. J. Varela & J. Shear eds. Depraz N. (2001), "The Husserlian Theory of Intersubjectivity as Alterology : Emergent Theories and Wisdom Traditions in the Light of Genetic Phenomenology", In : Between Ourselves. Second Person Issues in the Study of Consciousness (E. Thompson ed.), JCS, 8, n°5-7. Depraz N., Varela F. J., Vermersch P. (2003), On becoming aware : an experiential pragmatics, Amsterdam, Benjamins Press.
Affiliation: Maître de Conférences en philosophie à l'Université de la Sorbonne (Paris IV)