University College London
Abstract: Consider three answers to the question of what it is for you to be aware of the room you are in. (1) It is for the room in a way to exist. (2) It is for there to be neural activity in your head, however additionally described. (3) It is for there to be non-spatial facts somehow in your head. The first theory, unlike the other two, satisfies criteria for an adequate account of consciousness. The criteria have to do with the seeming nature of this consciousness and with subjectivity, reality and non-abstractness, mind-body causation, and the differences between perceptual, reflective and affective consciousness. The theory of consciousness as existence is not open to the objection of the deluded brain in a vat. The theory explains its own degree of failure in characterizing consciousness. It releases neuroscience and cognitive science from nervousness about consciousness. The theory is a reconstruction of our conception of consciousness. It may be that we should carry forward several theories of consciousness. But they will be compared in terms of truth to the criteria for an adequate theory.