Common Knowledge and Social Relationships
Přednáší:
Steven Pinker
Why do we veil our intentions in innuendo rather than blurting them out? Why do we blush and weep? Why do we express outrage at public violations of decorum? Why are dictators so threatened by free speech and public protests? Why don’t bystanders pitch in to help?
I suggest that these phenomena may be explained by the logical distinction between shared knowledge (A knows x and B knows x) and common knowledge (A knows x, B knows x, A knows that B knows x, B knows that A knows x, ad infinitum). Game theory specifies that common knowledge is necessary for coordination, in which two or more agents can cooperate for mutual benefit.
I propose represent common knowledge as a distinct cognitive category that licenses them to coordinate with others according to the rules of one of several distinct relationship types. Many puzzles of social life, such as hypocrisy, taboo, outrage, tact, and embarrassment arise from people’s desire to generate—or to avoid generating—common knowledge.
I suggest that these phenomena may be explained by the logical distinction between shared knowledge (A knows x and B knows x) and common knowledge (A knows x, B knows x, A knows that B knows x, B knows that A knows x, ad infinitum). Game theory specifies that common knowledge is necessary for coordination, in which two or more agents can cooperate for mutual benefit.
I propose represent common knowledge as a distinct cognitive category that licenses them to coordinate with others according to the rules of one of several distinct relationship types. Many puzzles of social life, such as hypocrisy, taboo, outrage, tact, and embarrassment arise from people’s desire to generate—or to avoid generating—common knowledge.